Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes by Arnow-Richman, Rachel
University of Florida Levin College of Law 
UF Law Scholarship Repository 
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
Winter 2001 
Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration 
of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee 
Noncompetes 
Rachel Arnow-Richman 
University of Florida Levin College of Law, rarnowrichman@law.ufl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of 
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 4 Or. L. Rev. 1163 (2001) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF 









Bargaining for Loyalty 1n the 
Information Age: A 
Reconsideration of the Role of 
Substantive Fairness in 
Enforcing Employee Noncompetes 1 
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I am indebted 
to Professors Rick Greenstein, Melissa Jacoby, Frank Snyder, and Anthony 
Nedweicki for their comments on earlier drafts and to Texas Wesleyan University 
School of Law for its support of this project. Special thanks are due to the Olin 
Program on Law and Economics' November 2000 Conference on Contracts with 
Highly Skilled Employees at the Georgetown University Law Center, which inspired 
many of the ideas in this Article. Valuable and enthusiastic research assistance was 
provided by Kristen Coyne, Shauna Sims, Julie Thurmond, and Allyson Totaro. 
I A version of this paper was presented at the Southern Industrial Relations and 
Human Resources Conference, October 4-6, 2001, at the University of Louisville. 
[1163] 
1164 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80, 2001) 
"The work will teach you how to do it." 2 
R ecently there has been increasing popular and scholarly at-tention to employer efforts to limit competitive behavior 
by departing employees, particularly in the high-tech sector of 
the economy.3 Both the use and enforcement of noncompete 
agreements 4 appear to be on the rise as employers contend with 
2 Anonymous proverb. 
3 Although noncompetes have always been a subject of academic debate, a signifi-
cant amount of scholarship in this area has been produced during the last decade. 
See, e.g., Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of "Involuntary " Contracts: The Judicial 
Rewriting of Unreasonable Covenants Not to Compete, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
71 (1999); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits 
of Transaction-Cost Analysis , 76 IND. L.J. 49, 56 (2001); Eric A. Posner & George 
Triantis , Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contract Perspective (Oct. 
20, 2000) , available at http ://www.law.uchicago .edu/Lawecon/index .html; Edward M . 
Schulman, An Economic Analysis of Employee Noncompetition Agreements, 69 
DEN. U. L. REV. 97 (1992); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 519 (2001); Andrew J. Gallo, Comment, A Uniform Rule for Enforcement of 
Non-Competition Contracts Considered in Relation to "Termination Cases", 1 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 719 (1998). For articles focusing on the particular problems asso-
ciated with the use of noncompetes in the high-tech industry, see Ronald J. Gilson, 
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U . L. REv. 575 (1999); Hanna 
Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should 
Know About Hiring Competitors ' Employees , 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981 (1997); Chris-
tine M. O'Malley , Note , Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech 
Industry : Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution , 79 B.U . L. REV. 1215 (1999); 
Dan Messeloff, Note , Giving the Green Light to Silicon Alley Employees: No-Com-
pete Agreements Between Internet Companies and Employees Under New York Law, 
11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711 (2001) ; cf Alan Hyde, Working 
in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market 
(2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing high-tech indus-
try's use of trade secret claims under California law to protect comparable employer 
interests). Popular concern with the use of noncompetes and related issues is re-
flected in the frequent media attention given to employers' pursuit of litigation 
against defecting employees . See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier , In a Bind over 
Noncompete Clauses: More Workers Caught in Grip of Required Agreemems, 
WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 2000, at El ( discussing increasing frequency of such agree-
ments and spotlighting use by Washington, D.C. area companies) ; Kelly Zito, Evolve 
Claims Intimidation by Peoplesoft, S.F. CttRON., Mar. 21, 2000, at Cl (reporting on 
litigation initiated by enterprise software manufacturer after eighteen employees 
opted for job opportunities with competitor company). 
4 This Article uses the term "noncompete" to refer to a written agreement in 
which the employee covenants not to engage in competition with the employer after 
termination. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Such a provision should 
be distinguished from other types of restrictive covenants , including nondisclosure 
agreements (through which the employee covenants not to reveal the employer's 
trade secrets or confidential information to future employers) and nonsolicitation 
agreements (through which the employee covenants not to solicit either employees 
or clients of the employer to participate with the employee in a future competitive 
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an increasingly mobile workforce.5 Employer reliance on such 
agreements is by no means extraordinary, and companies have 
attempted to protect their business interests in this manner for 
centuries.6 What the current economic climate makes clear, 
however, is that existing doctrine fails to address fully the inter­
ests that employers are attempting to safeguard in using noncom­
petes, which in turn has resulted in significant confusion in the 
case law.7 This Article elucidates the tension in existing legal
endeavor). While such additional promises frequently accompany promises not to 
compete in employment agreements, this Article focuses specifically on the issues 
raised by the most restrictive of these clauses, those that prohibit general competi­
tion, and considers such additional covenants only briefly by analogy. For a general 
explanation of the various types of restrictive covenants that may appear in an em­
ployment agreement, see Bui-Eve, supra note 3, at 1000-06. 
5 Evidence of the increasing use of noncompete agreements in employment con­
tracts is anecdotal but prevalent. There appears to be consensus among practicing 
attorneys that noncompete agreements are being more frequently requested from a 
greater variety of workers and more vigorously pursued posttermination. See, e.g., 
Bredemeier, supra note 3, at El (interviewing counsel noting recent rise in use of 
non-competes). An empirical study of court decisions performed by Professor Peter 
Whitmore in the late 1980s determined that the number of appellate decisions in­
volving noncompetition claims more than doubled between 1966 and 1988. See Pe­
ter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment 
Contracts, 15 J. CoRP. L. 483,484 n.2 (1990). More recently, Professor Katherine 
Stone noted even greater increases between the early 1970s and late 1990s. See 
Stone, supra note 3, at 577 n.239. It should be noted that such studies do not cap­
ture noncompete cases that failed to yield a written opinion, nor instances in which 
the presence of such an agreement deterred employee departure and therefore 
avoided litigation entirely. For this reason, the use of noncompete agreements is 
probably far more prevalent than those numbers suggest. See Charles A. Sullivan, 
Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Re­
straints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621, 622-23 (noting that "the number of decisions 
reported constitutes only the proverbial iceberg's tip" since subsequent employers 
can avoid litigation by using the employee outside the agreement's scope and be­
cause "the mere existence of such clauses ... induce[s] many employees ... not to 
leave their employment to begin with"). 
6 The first recorded instances of the use of employee noncompetition agreements 
date to fifteenth and sixteenth century England when such agreements were consid­
ered per se void as against public policy. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agree­
ments Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631-32 (1960) (summarizing early 
history of noncompete law). The modern rule of enforceability traces to an eight­
eenth century British decision concerning the use of such a clause in a sale of busi­
ness transaction. See id. at 629-31 (discussing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 
347,349 (Q.B. 1711)). 
7 Case law on noncompetes is strikingly inconsistent, making enforceability per­
haps one of the most complex, and consequently most litigated, areas of employ­
ment law. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 
685, 687 (Ohio 1952) (describing body of precedent as "a sea-vast and vacillating, 
overlapping and bewildering" out of which "[o]ne can fish ... any kind of strange 
support for anything"); Whitmore, supra note 5, at 485 (noting that the ambiguity 
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rules that limit enforceability of noncompetes based on particu-
larized notions of substantive fairness, and proposes an alterna-
tive theory of enforcement focusing on substantive and 
procedural issues that arise at the time noncompetes are formed. 
A central concern in the law and scholarship regarding 
noncompete agreements has long been the extent to which en-
forcement should be constrained to protect the mobility and eco-
nomic freedom of workers. Due to historical concerns about 
employees' lack of bargaining power, 8 courts have treated such 
agreements as narrow remedial tools, designed to prevent dam-
age to cognizable business interests, rather than as bargained-for 
alterations of the default rules of the employment relationship. 9 
Courts in effect require an employer to demonstrate an interest 
separate and apart from its interest in retaining the departing 
worker in order to obtain an injunction against competition. 10 
This Article argues that such a rule relies on an unworkable dis-
tinction between the employee and his or her work product, one 
which is incompatible with modern notions of the value of 
human capital. Where skilled labor is scarce, employers are apt 
to use noncompetes as a vehicle for retaining qualified workers 
as much as for protecting proprietary information and trade 
surrounding the enforceability has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and re-
ported decisions); infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
8 See, e.g., Arthur Murray, 105 N.E.2d at 704 (noting that the employee "is often 
in urgent need of selling [his labor] and in no position to object to boiler plate re-
strictive covenants placed before him to sign"; "[h]is individual bargaining power is 
seldom equal to that of his employer"); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 
302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. 1974) (noting strong public policy reason against enforcing 
noncompete agreements is "disparity in bargaining power" between employee and 
employer, where employee, "fearful of losing his means of livelihood ... contract[s] 
away his liberty to earn his livelihood in the field of his experience"); infra notes 26-
29 and accompanying text. 
9 The legal rules that have evolved to limit noncompete enforceability require em-
ployers to demonstrate a "legitimate" or "protectable" interest in trade secrets, con-
fidential information or customer relations as a threshold to accessing legal 
protection, and the extent of protection provided is limited to that which is reasona-
bly necessary to safeguard the interest asserted. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS§ 188 (1981); infra Part I.B. 
10 See McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs. L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1999) ("[A]n employer is not entitled to protection from an employee's 
knowledge, skill, or general information acquired through experience or instruction 
while in the [employer's] employment."); Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 
471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) ("In order for an employer to be entitled to [noncompete] 
protection, there must be special facts present over and above ordinary competi-
tion ... such that without the covenant not to compete the employee would gain an 
unfair advantage .... "); infra Part I.B. 
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secrets. As modern employment relationships become increas-
ingly short-term and traditional notions of employee loyalty de-
cline, employers may turn to noncompetes to enforce through 
legal means shared notions of obligation and commitment that 
were previously self-enforcing. 
The crux of the enforceability issue therefore is the relation-
ship between the informal norms that develop between compa-
nies and their workers and the written noncompete agreement 
that purports to define the terms of employment. 11 Because of 
the evolving nature of these relationships and the limited oppor-
tunities employees have to negotiate the terms of their noncom-
petes, there is reason to doubt that the employee's acceptance of 
such an agreement constitutes a knowing assumption of the risks 
of enforcement. 12 On the other hand, consideration of the par-
ties' informal understanding diminishes the predictive value of. 
written agreements and encourages employers to overreach in 
the drafting stage. 13 
Responding to this dilemma, this Article offers a formation-
based model of enforcement that draws on basic contract princi-
ples and the rules governing enforcement of premarital agree-
ments under domestic relations law. Like noncompetes, 
premarital agreements are an attempt to control in advance the 
financial consequences of the dissolution of a legal relationship, 
and they have historically been subjected to comparable scrutiny 
for fairness. In recent decades, the trend in evaluating the valid-
11 This is a central concern arising from relational contract theory, which suggests 
that exchanges take place within relational patterns that influence parties' behavior 
and the execution of the terms of their exchange. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE 
NEw SocIAL CoNTRAcr (1980): Ian R. Macneil. Values in Contract: Internal and 
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340, (1983) (hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract]; 
Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange. 46 BuFF. L. 
REv. 763 (1998): see generally infra Part Ill.C.l. The merits of the various ap-
proaches to considering relational norms and other values that may influence con-
tract interpretation are discussed infra in Part 111.C.2. 
12 Noncompetes generally contain boilerplate language and frequently are not 
provided to the employee until after he or she begins employment. See Curtis 1000, 
Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1994) (agreement signed two weeks after 
hire); Midwest Sports Mktg. v. Hillerich & Bradsby of Canada, Ltd., 552 N.W.2d 
254, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 
678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984) (agreements of three employees signed three weeks, two 
weeks, and one day after hire); cf Hopper D.V.M. v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 
861 P.2d 531, 536 (Wyo. 1993) (agreement signed nine months after promotion). At 
that point. the employee's ability to negotiate the agreement's terms is necessarily 
limited. See infra Part IV.C. 
13 See infra Part 111.C.2. 
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ity of premarital agreements has moved away from review of the 
substantive effects of enforcement in favor of assessing the qual-
ity of the spouse's consent and the fairness of the agreement at 
the time it was drafted. 14 Adopting this focus on formation in 
the context of noncompetes will normalize the enforcement of 
these agreements from the perspective of contract law. Ideally, it 
will also force parties to view such documents as binding contrac-
tual alternatives to informal relationships and consequently en-
courage them to enter into such agreements with caution and 
forethought. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I contains an over-
view of noncompete law and explains the evolution of the ex-
isting legal rules for determining enforceability. Part II critically 
considers the protectable interest requirement, the key doctrinal 
tool for assessing the fairness of noncompete agreements. It as-
serts that this approach fails to effectively address employers' in-
terest in human capital or provide a workable standard for 
enforcement. Part III recharacterizes the employer's interest in 
using noncompete agreements as an interest in its workers. That 
usage may be justified as a means of protecting the employer's 
investment in employee development or of enforcing an implicit 
exchange of training and experience for spot commitments to 
particular projects. At the same time, such usage creates oppor-
tunities for employers to reach beyond the terms of the parties' 
shared understanding that cannot easily be resolved through ju-
dicial modification of the written agreement. Part IV explains 
the developing law of premarital agreements and proposes a for-
mation-based model of noncompete enforceability. The new 
model limits judicial consideration of circumstances surrounding 
enforcement, focusing instead on the legitimacy of the parties' 
bargaining process, the quality of their exchange, and the reason-
ableness of the terms as of the time of drafting. 
14 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6, 9C U.L.A. 376 (2001) (providing 
that a premarital agreement is enforceable unless it was not executed voluntarily, or 
was unconscionable at the time it was formed and the party opposing enforcement 
did know of or receive fair disclosure of his or her partner's assets); see also infra 
Part IV.B. 
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A noncompete is a written 15 agreement in which an employee 
covenants at the outset 16 of the employment relationship that he 
or she will refrain from competing with the employer in specified 
ways for a period of time following the termination of the rela-
15 Only a small minority of states recognize oral noncompete agreements. See, 
e.g., Metcalfe Invs., Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Alaska 1996). Enforcea-
ble restraints are almost always in writing and some jurisdictions so require. See, 
e.g., ChemiMetals Processing , Inc . v. McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1996); Geritrex Corp. v. DermaRite Indus., 910 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
In recent years, however , courts have held as a matter of trade secret law that, de-
spite the absence of a noncompete agreement, an employer may be entitled to an 
injunction preventing competition in limited situations where any competitive em-
ployment by the employee would lead to disclosure. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond . 
54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) ( enjoining employee from working where employ-
ment by competitor would inevitability lead to disclosure of trade secret distribution 
systems and marketing strategies used in plaintiffs ' sports beverage business): Merck 
& Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp . 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (applying inevitable disclo-
sure theory to enjoin future employment where employee 's new job at drug com-
pany would involve same duties and require disclosure of former employer's supply 
agreements and projected product launch date). But see Bayer Corp. v. Roche Mo-
lecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that "Califor-
nia trade-secrets law does not recognize the theory of inevitable disclosure; indeed, 
such a rule would run counter to the strong public policy in California favoring em-
ployee mobility "); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co .. 148 F. Supp. 2d 
1326, 1337 (S.D . Fla . 2001) (noting that " [a]bsent evidence of actual or threatened 
misappropriation , a court should not allow a(n) (employer] to use inevitable disclo-
sure as an after-the-fact noncompete agreement to enjoin an emplo yee from work-
ing for the employer of his or her choice") . 
16 Despite the fact that the employee frequently does not sign the agreement until 
after he or she begins working , see supra note 12. most court s have held that the 
offer of continued employment constitutes consideration for the employee's prom-
ise. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc., 24 F.3d at 945 (finding that third noncompete cove-
nant signed sixteen years after initial employment was supported by consideration 
because employee salesman was retained for an additional eight years); Abel v. Fox, 
654 N.E .2d 591, 593 (111. App . Ct. 1995) (finding that "(c]ontinued employment con-
stitutes adequate consideration for a post-employment covenant not to compete " 
signed in 1990 after employment had begun earlier that same year) . In instances in 
which the agreement is requested long after employment commences, however , 
some courts require that the employee receive some increase in compensation , au-
thority , or benefits to support the employee 's promise . See , e.g. , Freeman v. Duluth 
Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626,630 (Minn . 1983) (holding that noncompete agreement 
signed by employee two years after beginning employment and months after receiv-
ing a new promotion was invalid because employer offered no new consideration 
such as a pay raise, new promotion , or other benefit). 
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tionship. 17 While such ·agreements conform to contractual for-
malities, they are governed by a unique system of rules that 
substantially constrain their enforceability based on principles of 
substantive fairness. Due to normative concerns about employ-
ees' ability to bargain effectively and the potential impact of such 
agreements on employees' economic freedom, courts have re-
stricted the use of noncompetes to the protection of discrete bus-
iness interests that can be demonstrated at the time enforcement 
is sought. The following section briefly explores the policy issues 
underlying questions of enforceability and explains their doctri-
nal legacy. 
A. Themes, Standards, and the Problem of Competing Policies 
In assessing a request for injunctive relief pursuant to a 
noncompete agreement, a court is explicitly or implicitly balanc-
ing fundamental principles: freedom of contract, respect for per-
sonal autonomy, protection of the economic mobility of 
individuals, and, of course, the desire to enhance economic de-
velopment in a manner that will benefit society as a whole. 18 On 
the one hand, noncompetes can be seen as legal tools necessary 
to preserve key business interests and relationships. 19 On the 
other hand, they may be considered tools of oppression, non-ne-
gotiable covenants imposed by employers that essentially inden-
17 For sample noncompete clauses see GALE R. PETERSON, TRADE SECRET PRo-
TECrION IN AN INFORMATION AGE C-53, C-63 (1997). 
18 See Blake, supra note 6, at 626-27 (summarizing key policy concerns underlying 
issues of noncompete enforceability). 
19 See, e.g., Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Plunkett. 8 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D. Va. 
1998) (recognizing "that a company spending a great deal of time and money culti-
vating clients may see its efforts destroyed when a former broker violates a restric-
tive covenant and solicits his former company's clients"); PSC, Inc. v. Reiss, 111 F. 
Supp. 2d 252, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that employers have an interest in 
preventing the employee from working for a competitor's company where "the tran-
sient employee possesses highly confidential or technical knowledge concerning 
manufacturing processes, marketing strategies, or the like"); Darugar v. Hodges, 471 
S.E.2d 33, 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that employer had the "right to protect 
itself from the risk that the former employee might use contacts ... cultivated [while 
employed] to unfairly appropriate customers"); BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 
N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (N.Y. 1999) (finding a legitimate interest "in preventing former 
employees from exploiting or appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer, 
which had been created and maintained at the employer's expense, to the em-
ployer's competitive detriment"); Reed. Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 
N.E.2d 590. 593 (N.Y. 1976) (recognizing "the legitimate interest an employer has in 
safeguarding that which his business made successful and to protect himself against 
deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy"). 
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ture the employee to a single master. 20 
Historically, the dominant concern has been the risk of depriv-
ing individual employees of their ability to earn a living. During 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, courts sought to protect ap-
prentices, who purchased their training and license to trade 
through the guild system, by preventing masters from extending 
the requisite period of servitude through the use of restrictive 
covenants .21 The dominance of the apprenticeship system as a 
means of entering a trade combined with the relative difficulty of 
traveling outside one's town or village made even narrow geo-
graphic limitations on postemployment competition particularly 
onerous. 22 Thus, the earliest recorded cases voided such agree-
ments as unfair restraints of trade. 23 
The idea that all such restraints are invalid gave way to a more 
tempered approach by the early part of the eighteenth century. 
In Mitchel v. Reynolds ,24 an English court held that a limited re-
straint on future competition pursuant to a sale-of-business 
agreement could be valid where it was supported by good consid-
eration under circumstances appearing just and honest. In so de-
ciding, the court identified the concerns which ultimately formed 
the basis of the modern rule: the possible loss to the promisor of 
his or her means of earning a living, the danger of corporate mo-
nopolization, and the potential loss to society of the services of 
one of its members. 25 Although the case involved a covenant an-
cillary to a sale of a business rather than an employment con-
20 See , e.g. , Prudemial Sec. , 8 F. Supp . 2d at 519 ( characterizing covenant not to 
compete as a "contract of adhesion " that must be strictly construed against enforce-
ment): Vortex Protective Serv . v. Dempsey , 463 S.E .2d 67, 69 (G a. Ct. App. 1995) 
(noting that noncompete agr eements " injure the [employees) making them, diminish 
the ir means of procuring live lihoods and a competency for their families [and] ... 
deprive [them] of the power to mak e future acquisitions , and expo se them to imposi-
tion and oppression"); Bennet v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 
1965) (holding that noncompete agreements "are looked upon with disfavor, cau-
tiously considered, and carefully scrutinized"). 
2 1 See Blake, supra note 6, at 632-39 (describing history of noncompete use in 
England and treatment und er British common law). 
22 See id. at 632. 
23 See generally id. at 631-32 (summarizing first four known recorded decisions 
from 1414 through sixteenth century) . Another explanation for the case holdings of 
this period is that courts were motivated to preserve the structures of the existing 
guild system: thus the voiding of such agreements can be characterized as a con-
servative effort to preserve the social status quo as opposed to a progressive move to 
protect workers. Id. at 632 . 
24 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 349 (Q .B. 1711 ). 
25 See id. at 350. 
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tract, the court noted in dicta the peculiar risks of applying such 
covenants in the employment setting: It expressed concern that 
abusive masters might utilize such agreements to prevent em-
ployees from engaging in legitimate competition at the end of 
their period of servitude. 26 Thus, in upholding the sale-of-busi-
ness covenant before it, the court opened the door to enforce-
ability of comparably worded covenants between employer and 
employee and at the same time raised the key policy concerns 
that would constrain judicial enforcement in future cases. 27 
The Mitchel v. Reynolds "rule of reason," as it has come to be 
called, ultimately formed the standard to be used in analyzing 
both sale-of-business and employee noncompete agreements. It 
was adopted by American courts and to this day characterizes 
the dominant judicial approach to enforceability. 28 So too has 
the social rhetoric of court decisions remained focused on the 
protection of individual workers. Modern courts routinely ap-
peal to employees' lack of bargaining power in rendering a deci-
26 See id. (recognizing that masters were liable to "give their apprentices much 
vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds 
from them, lest they should prejudice them in their custom, when they come to set 
up for themselves"). 
27 The distinction between agreements not to compete in employment contracts 
and those incorporated in contracts to sell a business remains viable, the latter type 
generally being viewed more favorably by courts and legislatures. See, e.g. , CAL. 
Bus. & PROF. CooE §§ 16600-16602.5 (West 1997) (declaring all contracts in re-
straint of trade void except those ancillary to the sale of a business or business inter-
est or the dissolution of a partnership); Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 
730 F. Supp. 1209, 1214 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that restrictive covenants ancillary 
to the sale of a business are "routinely enforced" whereas those appearing in em-
ployment agreements are "'rigorously examined'"). The distinction is based in part 
on the assumption that the promisor in the sale of business context will likely have 
greater bargaining power than an ordinary employee. See Watson v. Waffle House, 
324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985) ("[A] contract of employment inherently involves 
parties of unequal bargaining power to the extent that the result is often a contract 
of adhesion ... [while] a contract for the sale of a business interest is far more likely 
to be one entered into by parties on equal footing."); see also Blake, supra note 6, at 
648. It also reflects recognition of the fact that a business owner's ability to sell a 
going concern would be seriously undercut if he or she could not promise to refrain 
from future competition. See id. at 646 ("A transfer of good will cannot be effec-
tively accomplished without an enforceable agreement by the transferor not to act 
so as unreasonably to diminish the value of that which he is selling."). 
28 See, e.g., Mattis v. Lally, 82 A.2d 155, 156 (Conn. 1951); Ricou v. Crosland, 88 
So. 380, 381 (Fla. 1921 ); Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 737 (Ga. 1898); People v. 
Sheldon, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (N.Y. 1893); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 24 S.W. 397, 400 
(Tex. 1893); see generally Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agree-
ments: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 709 (1985) (noting that the Mitchel 
v. Reynolds rule "has survived virtually unchanged to the present day"). 
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sion against noncompete enforcement. As stated by an Ohio 
court in the oft-cited Arthur Murray v. Witter decision: 
The average, individual employee has little but his labor to sell 
or to use to make a living. He is often in urgent need of selling 
it and in no position to object to boiler plate restrictive cove-
nants placed before him to sign. To him, the right to work and 
support his family is the most important right he possesses. 
His individual bargaining power is seldom equal to that of his 
employer. 29 
Thus, while courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions have 
taken the position that noncompete agreements are enforceable 
if reasonable,3° they have done so with reluctance. Courts conse-
quently assess enforceability questions from a deeply ingrained 
point of view that noncompetes are the product of coerced agree-
ment and will in most cases detrimentally curtail the individual 
worker's freedom to earn a living. 
B. Rules, Thresholds, and the Requirement of a 
Protectable Interest 
The legacy of these historical policy concerns manifests in the 
current doctrinal test for evaluating the substantive fairness of 
noncompete agreements. While concerns about bargaining 
power often underscore judicial decisions, the doctrinal analysis 
courts utilize eschews questions of contract formation in favor of 
examination of the purposes and effects of the covenant. 31 Ac-
29 Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952); see also PSC Inc. v. Reiss, 111 F. Supp. 2d 252, 257 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that "no restrictions should fetter an employee's right to 
apply to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall 
experience of his previous employment"); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Plunkett, 8 F. 
Supp. 2d 514,519 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that "[g]iven the inequality of bargaining 
power, [employee] could not request ... the contract be changed without risking 
denial of employment"); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. 
1974) (noting a strong public policy reason against enforcing noncompete agree-
ments is "disparity of bargaining power" between employee and employer, where 
employee, "fearful of losing his means of livelihood ... contract[s] away his liberty 
to earn his livelihood in the field of his experience"). 
30 A limited number of states refuse to enforce noncompetes in employment 
agreements or place substantial additional limits on their usage. See CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997); Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2001) (providing 
limited protection for trade secrets, recovery of expenses for training or educating, 
and executive and management personnel, officers, and their professional staff); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987). 
31 For instance, courts will rarely examine the consideration supporting a noncom-
pete agreement, presuming that the offer of employment itself is sufficient, see supra 
note 16, and despite the rhetoric of unequal bargaining power, courts almost never 
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cording to the classic formulation in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, a covenant not to compete is "unreasonably in re-
straint of trade," and hence unenforceable, where (1) "the re-
straint is greater than what is needed to protect the promissee's 
legitimate interests" or (2) the promissee's need is outweighed by 
hardship to the promisor or the public at large. 32 In essence, the 
Restatement provision reflects not a "rule" of reasonableness so 
much as a standard by which courts can achieve a balance of in-
terests.33 A court must weigh the needs of the employer, charac-
terized as its "legitimate" or "protectable" interests, against the 
gravity of the restriction placed on the mobility and economic 
freedom of the employee. 34 Oddly, its function is to consider not 
inquire into the quality of the employee's consent. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints 
on the Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 409 (1993) (noting that 
courts apply the "reasonableness" test even in situations involving sophisticated par-
ties bargaining at arms' length with the assistance of counsel). The viability of an 
approach to noncompete enforceability based on close scrutiny of the formation 
process is discussed at length in Part V, infra. 
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
33 See ALTA Analytics, Inc. v. Muuss, 75 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (S.D. Ohio 1999) 
(noting that the applicable state law "has eschewed a bright line rule in favor of an 
overall standard of 'reasonableness,' that enables courts to consider all factors rele-
vant to the contract and to 'fashion a contract' that is reasonable based on the facts 
of the case"); see generally CAROL M. RosE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: EssA YS 
ON THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 200 (1994) (characteriz-
ing the movement away from "clear, open-and-shut demarcations of entitlement" to 
"fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision," often based on principles of equity or reasona-
bleness, as a "substitution of 'mud' rules for 'crystal' ones"). 
34 In precise accordance with the Restatement rule, some jurisdictions also con-
sider the damage to society that may result from the loss of the employee's services. 
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. v. de Liniere, 572 F. Supp. 246, 249 
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (noting that "the public has little interest in having its choice re-
stricted to brokers other than the one who has served them" in denying an injunc-
tion barring broker from serving his former clients); Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 
981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (voiding noncompete agreement restricting employee from 
opening a sandwich shop anywhere in the world because it injured the public as a 
whole by permanently depriving the public of employee's sandwich shop and stifling 
competition). However, in most cases, courts do not treat societal interest as a fac-
tor to be considered separately from its two-step inquiry assessing protectable inter-
est and reasonableness of scope. See Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, 
Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
669, 717-20 (1982) (suggesting that public injury was used by the common law 
merely to invalidate covenants or agreements where no protectable interest was 
shown, and not as a separate requirement to be factored into every decision which 
analyzes the reasonableness of the restriction); Lester, supra note 3, at 56 (explain-
ing that public interests are most often adversely affected when the restrictions are 
not reasonable in scope). Those limited instances where societal interest is given 
distinct attention tend to involve highly specialized employees engaged in essential 
services. See Merrill Lynch, 572 F. Supp. at 249 (noting that "[a] stock broker stands 
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so much the language of the covenant or traditional contract de-
fenses, but the operation of the covenant in relation to the situa-
tion in which its enforcement is sought. 35 
This balancing of interests takes place within a developed doc-
trinal framework that contains specified prerequisites to enforce-
ment. At the threshold, employers must show that they have an 
underlying interest that the law is willing to recognize. Employ-
ers have no right to enforce a noncompete merely for purposes 
of indenturing an employee to his or her current post, nor any 
right to prevent competition per se.36 To avoid unfair effects on 
employees and competitors, courts require the presence of spe-
cial interests or circumstances that justify a restriction. 37 If there 
in a different relationship to his customers from that of other kinds of salesman" 
because "of the important role of the broker in protecting the financial welfare of 
his clients"); Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 577 (111. App. Ct. 
2000) (finding agreement restricting physician from practicing medicine within a 
twenty-mile radius unenforceable as against public policy because it would "deprive 
at least some patients of an on going relationship with the physician of their 
choice"). 
35 See Stone, supra note 3, at 578 (noting that the law of noncompete enforceabil-
ity "occupies a peculiar legal never-never land, somewhere between contract and 
tort, in which party consent and externally imposed obligation are intimately but 
complexly intertwined"). 
36 See Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 909, 912 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the "avoidance of competition is not a legitimate busi-
ness interest sufficient to justify such an uncertain geographic limitation" as the one 
imposed on employee physician); Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver. Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 
(Tenn. 1984) ("[A]ny competition by a former employee may well injure the busi-
ness of the employer. An employer, however, cannot by contract restrain ordinary 
competition."). 
37 See, e.g., Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc .. 579 So. 2d 127, 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (noting in support of the protectable interest rule that "all consumers 
benefit from the availability of goods and services, the quality and price of which are 
determined by fair competition, unfettered by artificial monopolistic practices"); 
Vortex Protective Serv., Inc. v. Dempsey, 463 S.E.2d 67. 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
The Vortex court noted that unreasonable employee restraints 
"tend to deprive the public of services of [citizens] in the employments and 
capacities in which they may be most useful to the community ... , discour-
age industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of ingenuity and 
skill; prevent competition and enhance prices, and expose the public to all 
the evils of monopoly." 
Id. (quoting Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 738 (Ga. 1898)); Reed, Roberts As-
soc., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (expressing distrust of 
noncompete agreements because "our economy is premised on the competition en-
gendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas"); Hasty, 671 S.W.2d 
at 473 ("In order for an employer to be entitled to [noncompete] protection. there 
must be special facts present over and above ordinary competition ... such that 
without the covenant not to compete the employee would gain an unfair 
advantage."). 
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is no such interest identified, or if the interest is judged insuffi-
cient, enforcement is denied. 
Those interests that satisfy this test and constitute "protect-
able" employer interests fall into two doctrinal categories: inter-
ests in customer relationships or business goodwill 38 and interests 
in confidential or secret business information. 39 The classic sce-
nario implicating the customer relationship interest is the sales-
person or customer account representative. Where an 
employee's primary function is to market products to clients, a 
reasonable covenant preventing that employee from marketing 
comparable products in the same geographical area on behalf of 
a competitor is generally enforceable. 40 In such situations the 
law recognizes that the employer is neither attempting to inden-
ture the employee nor restrain legitimate competition, but rather 
is seeking to prevent the employee from departing with the cus-
tomer base that the employer developed. 
38 See, e.g., Farr Assocs., Inc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(finding employer consulting firm had a legitimate interest in protecting its customer 
base where employee was a behavioral consultant for large companies who devel-
oped close relationships with employee and would be inclined to take their business 
with the departing employee); Mertz v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co., 625 N.W.2d 197, 
204 (Neb. 2001) (finding employer had legitimate interest in protecting its customer 
goodwill because employee was the "only [salesman] in most of Nebraska for three 
years ... and would have had the opportunity to appropriate [customers]"); BDO 
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (N.Y. 1999) (noting that "[t]he em-
ployer has a legitimate interest in preventing former employees from exploiting or 
appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer, which had been created and 
maintained at the employer's expense, to the employer's competitive detriment"). 
39 See, e.g., Comprehensive Tech. Int'I, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 
739 ( 4th Cir. 1993) ("When an employee has access to confidential and trade secret 
information crucial to the success of the employer's business, the employer has 
strong interests in enforcing a covenant not to compete because other legal remedies 
often prove inadequate."); Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that noncompetes are enforceable '"to the extent necessary 
(I) to prevent an employee's solicitation or disclosure of trade secrets, [ and] (2) to 
prevent an employee's release of confidential information regarding employer's cus-
tomers"') (quoting Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
4° Cases which are particularly convincing to courts are those in which the product 
sold is fungible or where it is easy for the customer to mistake the sales person with 
the actual employer. See, e.g., Diversified Fastening Sys., Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F. Supp. 
1486, 1489 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (noting that the products sold in the concrete fastener 
industry were fungible and, therefore, "direct contact with customers by a com-
pany's sales force and the relationship between the sales force and the customer are 
the most important factors in making sales"); McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs., 
L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing as protectable good-
will employee's direct contact with customers, where employee was a salesman for a 
waste management company and admitted customers regarded him as the 
employer). 
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The interest in so-called proprietary information is more com-
plicated. Courts have consistently held that employers cannot 
possess a protectable interest in an employee's general skills or 
know-how. 41 To legitimize a noncompete agreement based on 
business information, an employer must do more than simply 
supply the employee with general training or experience; it must 
demonstrate that the employee was privy to trade secrets or 
other confidences. 42 The modern concept of a trade secret en-
compasses any information which endows the holder with a com-
petitive advantage and which is not generally known or available 
within the industry. 43 Thus, under varying circumstances, cus-
tomer lists, pricing methods, marketing strategies, product speci-
fications, costs, and profit margins have been held to constitute 
protectable interests justifying a postemployment restraint. 44 
4 1 See, e.g., McGlothen, 705 N.E.2d at 1072 ("[ A )n employer is not entitled to 
protection from an employee's knowledge, skill, or general information acquired 
through experience or instruction while in the [employer's) employment."); Carolina 
Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 724 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("One 
who has worked in a particular field cannot be compelled to erase from his mind all 
of the general skills, knowledge and expertise acquired through his experience."). 
The distinction between general knowledge and confidential information is dis-
cussed more fully in Part II.A, infra. 
42 Compare BABN Techs. Corp. v. Bruno, Civ. A. No. 98-3409, 1998 WL 720171, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1998) (finding sequencing strategy and product information 
of employer's lottery company was protectable as confidential information "despite 
its lack of status as trade secret"), with Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So. 2d 
961, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no protectable interest in employee 
training because sending employee on seminars and training employee to do general 
skills associated with floor stripping did not provide employee with "any unique or 
specialized training"); see also Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 132 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no protectable interest where employee learned 
to repair cruise control units and cellular telephones because such training did not 
"go[ ) beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary in the industry"). The 
distinction between general skill training and trade secrets is discussed more fully in 
Part II.B, infra. 
43 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§ 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); 
see also Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907, 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) 
(defining trade secret as "the whole or any portion or phrase of any scientific or 
technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, improvement, confiden-
tial business or financial information ... or other information relating to any busi-
ness or profession which is secret and of value"); Carolina Chem. Equip. Co., 471 
S.E.2d at 724 ("A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compi-
lation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."); see 
infra Part II.A. 
44 See, e.g., Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 629-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(finding "Cybex prototypes of new and future equipment, including manufacturing 
costs and pricing structure, sales training, projected release dates and projected life 
span" to be confidential information not generally known outside of the company); 
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Assuming that an employer is able to demonstrate a protect-
able interest in one of these two ways,45 the employer must then 
show that the terms of the covenant are reasonable under the 
circumstances, This reasonableness inquiry focuses on three ele-
ments: the temporal duration of the restraint, the geographic 
boundaries in which the employee is prevented from engaging in 
competitive employment, and the scope of the covenant, mean-
ing the way in which competitive employment violative of the 
agreement is defined. 46 If the covenant is broader in these re-
spects than what is deemed necessary to protect the employer's 
Centro!, Inc. v. Morrow, 489 N.W.2d 890, 894 (S.D. 1992) (finding that agricultural 
consulting company's customer lists, revenue reports, financial statements, patron 
survey forms, soil test results and crop consulting data were confidential information 
which could be protected by a noncompete). 
45 Some jurisdictions also recognize a protectable interest where the services of 
the employee are in some way unique, such as where the employee is a well-known 
artist, athlete or performer. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guard-
smark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 501 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (recognizing employer interest in 
employees "possessing special, unique, or extraordinary qualifications ... [like] 
newspaper writers and reporters; actors and actresses; singers; music teachers; [and] 
professional athletes"). However, this interest has been confined to narrow circum-
stances where it is the name of the defendant, not just the work he or she provides, 
that makes performance valuable, such that the employee's persona is a form of 
employer goodwill. See, e.g., MTV Networks v. Fox Kids Worldwide, Inc., No. 
605580/97, 1998 WL 57480, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 1998) (finding defendant was 
"unique employee" due to his role as master of ceremonies for presentations to 
future advertisers and media persons and was perceived as the "'public face' of 
MTVN"). Even so, such cases usually involve the presence of other forms of pro-
tectable interests, like confidential information, in addition to unique services. See 
Nigra v. Young Broad. of Albany, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) 
(noting that '"unique services' is a very slim reed which has never actually served as 
the sole basis for judicial enforcement of an anti-competition clause"). 
46 There is a sliding scale relationship between these considerations; that is, the 
more narrowly the document is drawn in one area, the more tolerant a court will be 
of other more broadly worded elements. See, e.g., Am. Software USA. Inc. v. 
Moore, 448 S.E.2d 206, 207 (Ga. 1994) (noting that as the category of customers the 
employer is trying to protect becomes more narrow, the need for a defined territo-
rial restriction becomes less necessary); Farr Assocs., Inc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878, 
881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("Although either the time or the territory restriction, 
standing alone, may be reasonable, the combined effect of the two may be unreason-
able. A longer period of time is acceptable where the geographic restriction is rela-
tively small, and vice versa."). Thus, where the scope of competitive behavior can be 
limited, modern courts have shown a willingness to uphold national or even interna-
tional geographic restraints, previously considered void, in recognition of the legiti-
macy of corporate interests extending beyond conventional boundaries in the 
increasingly globalized marketplace. See, e.g., Superior Consulting Co. v. Walling, 
851 F. Supp. 839, 847 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding absence of any geographic term 
acceptable where former employer did business in forty-three states and with for-
eign nations and scope of competitive behavior could be reduced): Farr Assocs., 
Inc .. 530 S.E.2d at 882 (rejecting argument that covenant was overly broad due to 
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legitimate interests, the court will, in most jurisdictions, redraft 
or "blue-pencil" the provision to accommodate what it perceives 
as the needs of the employer in light of the anticipated effect of 
the restraint on the employee's ability to earn a livelihood. 47 
Thus, the modern approach to noncompete agreements is one 
of limited enforceability pursuant to distinct doctrinal specifica-
tions. The policy concerns historically in tension within this area 
of law are given voice in a two-step test requiring the employer 
to demonstrate special circumstances that legitimize its use of the 
agreement. This approach recognizes discrete interests as per-
missible, largely because they are deemed reflective of what is 
considered to be employer property. 48 In the absence of thresh-
absence of defined territorial limit where scope of covenant was limited to servicing 
clients of former employer). 
47 There are three approaches to the problem of noncompetes that are overbroad 
in scope , duration , or geographic limitation. Some courts will uphold the agreement 
provided it can delete, or "blue-pencil ," the unreasonable portion of the agreement. 
See , e.g. , Li cocci v. Cardinal Assocs ., Inc., 445 N. E.2d 556, 561-62 (Ind . 1983); Dixie 
Parking Serv. v. Hargrove , 691 So. 2d 1316, 1320-21 (La . Ct. App . 1997) (blue-pen-
ciling agreement 's geographic scope by deleting nine listed parishes and retaining 
only the two parishes where employer currently operated) . Oth ers are willing to 
redraft the agreement entirely to create a reasonable restraint even if the offending 
portion of the agreement cannot be grammatically severed from the whole. See, 
e.g., Marshall v. Gore, 506 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1987) (redrafting agree-
ment that prohibited employee from working for any computer software business to 
create prohibition against working for a competitor of employer) ; Raimonde v. Van 
Vlerah , 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (Ohio 1975) (rejecting the 'blue-pencil ' doctrine as 
overly strict because "the entire contract fails if offending provisions cannot be 
stricken ," and choosing to modify the contract in such a way that both parties would 
find reasonable) . A minority of courts decline to revise overbroad agreements en-
tirely, and simply find them unenforceable if they overreach in any way. See , e.g. , 
Harville v. Gunter , 495 S.E.2d 862. 864 (Ga. Ct. App . 1998); Mid-States Paint & 
Chem. Co v. Herr, 746 S.W.2d 613. 616 (Mo . Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "if the 
contract contains no specifically expressed time or geographic al limitations the court 
may not write into the contract any such limitations but must declare the entire 
provision void"); see generally Callahan, supra note 28, at 710 (describing the three 
approaches and discussing their prevalence). 
48 Of course , if the employee is appropriating that which is considered employer 
property , the conduct would be actionable under tort law irrespective of the 
noncompete agreement. Thus , it has sometimes been suggested that an interpreta-
tion of noncompete law that limits protection based on principles of ownership un-
necessarily duplicates existing law. As discussed in Part II.A , infra , a strong 
argument can be made that extant case law on noncompete enforceability in fact 
recognizes employer interests beyond those protectable through claims of misappro-
priation of trade secrets and violations of the employee duty of loyalty . See infra 
note 84 and accompanying text. However, even assuming the rights are coextensive 
under these regimes. noncomp etes are still valuable to employers in that they offer a 
preventive remedy. Tort law requires that the employer demonstrate actual or 
threatened misappropriation. which can be difficult to prove and which requires the 
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old circumstances, such as employee access to proprietary busi-
ness information, it is considered likely that the employer is using 
the covenant for an improper purpose or is exploiting the em-
ployee.49 Thus, the primary purpose of the protectable interest 
requirement is to screen legitimate from illegitimate uses of 
noncompetes, while the reasonableness inquiry ensures that the 
restraint requested does not reach beyond that which is neces-
sary for protection of those limited interests. 50 
II 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN WORKER AND WORK 
PRODUCT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
PROTECTABLE INTEREST MODEL 
A starting point for assessing the effectiveness of the current 
doctrinal approach is the universal uncertainty that exists among 
both lawyers and laypeople as to whether and when a court will 
deem a given covenant enforceable. Noncompete law is an area 
fraught with ambiguity stemming not from the absence of author-
employer to suffer the disclosure it wishes to avoid by applying for relief. See, e.g. , 
Comprehensive Techs. Int'I, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 
1993) (finding evidence of short development time and lack of documentation in 
former employees' creation of competitive software product insufficient to demon-
strate unlawful copying and denying plaintiff's misappropriation of trade secret 
claim); Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561-62 
(4th Cir. 1990) (noting that because judges will not issue injunctions until disclosure 
is imminent or has already occurred, the former employee "tends to get 'one free 
bite' at the trade secret"). A noncompete entitles the employer to an immediate 
injunction provided the mere existence of a trade secret or confidential information 
is established. See id. at 561-62 (suggesting that employers often request such agree-
ments to avoid onerous proof requirements associated with seeking an injunction 
against trade secret disclosure). 
49 See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 
1976) (finding that "real purpose" of noncompete was "to prevent any voluntary 
withdrawals from the firm and compel active partners who came in with clients ... 
to remain with the firm indefinitely" and agreement therefore "savored of 
servitude"). 
50 It should be noted that despite the precision of the doctrine, courts do not al-
ways conform clearly to these distinct steps in rendering their analyses. See Edward 
M. Schulman, 69 DENY. U. L. REV. 97, 98 (1992) (observing that while courts pur-
port to utilize a multistep test, "any consideration of hardship to the employee and 
injury to the public is usually subsumed by the analysis of the employer's protectable 
interest"); Gary P. Kohn, Comment, A Fresh Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of 
Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to Employment Contracts and to Sale of Busi-
ness Contracts in Georgia, 31 EMORY L.J. 635, 646 (1982) (suggesting that courts 
often inappropriately disregard the threshold requirement that the employer 
demonstrate a protectable interest when the terms of the covenant appear reasona-
ble under the second prong of the legal test). 
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ity, but the excess of it, much of which is facially inconsistent. 51 
The abundance of law and lack of clarity have affected the prac-
tices of employees and employers, who are often ill-informed 
about the ramifications of these agreements. 52 Departing em-
ployees often mistakenly believe that these clauses are never en-
forceable, while employers are at times dismayed to find their 
carefully crafted agreements rejected as unreasonable. Thus, 
from a pragmatic perspective, the current law falls short of estab-
lishing the framework necessary to negotiate fairly between the 
needs of the employer and employee in the context of any partic-
ular employee defection. 53 
From a theoretical perspective, this confusion and lack of con-
sistency reflect a fundamental problem with the premise on 
which the current test is based-the idea that employers' legiti-
mate business interests are tangible and discrete and can be dis-
tinguished from the employee. The following section considers 
courts' use of protectable interests as a proxy for determining 
when a noncompete agreement is appropriate from a policy per-
spective. Within that model, the subcategory of "confidential in-
51 As put most eloquently by the Ohio court in Arthur Murray: 
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find 
enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much authority it 
drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. 
One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for anything, if he lives so 
long. 
Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter , 105 N.E.2d 685, 687; see also 
Sterk , supra note 31, at 404 (noting that use of a reasonablene ss standard rather 
than a bright line rule encourages inefficient litigation of enforceability issues); 
Whitmore, supra note 5, at 485 (noting that the ambiguity surrounding enforceabil-
ity has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and reported decisions). If this was the 
status of the law forty-five years ago when the Arthur Murray court ruled, one can 
only imagine how much more unnavigable the waters are today. 
52 See Kurt H. Decker, Refining Pennsylvania's Standard for Invalidating a Non-
Competition Restrictive Covenant When an Employee's Termination ls Unrelated to 
the Employer's Protectible Business Interest, 104 DICK. L. R E V. 619,621 (2000) (not-
ing that employers are often mistaken about the proper uses of restrictive cove-
nants); Whitmore, supra note 5, at 485 (noting that abundance of precedent makes it 
difficult for lawyers to predict how courts will treat a given noncompete ); Gallo, 
supra note 3, at 733 (noting that because there is no way to predict whether a cove-
nant will be enforced , it is difficult for an employer to confidently write such an 
agreement even where its interests are strong); cf Sterk, supra note 31, at 438 (not-
ing the uncertainty generated by distinctions between enforceable and unenforce-
able noncompetes in sale of business context). 
53 This uncertainty has significant economic implications. See Callahan, supra 
note 28, at 705 (noting that uncertain validity of noncompetes causes employers to 
rely less upon such agreements, resulting in lower wages for employees having ac-
cess to confidential information, and creates incentives for employees to breach). 
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formation" has grown increasingly important as a basis for 
protection. In theory, employee access to such business informa-
tion suggests that the employer's intent in requesting enforce-
ment of a covenant is to prevent the improper disclosure of 
information that it owns, as distinct from asserting any claim to 
the employee or to the employee's own knowledge or experi-
ence. As will be seen, the concept of confidential business infor-
mation escapes meaningful definition, and in many situations, 
particularly those involving employer-provided training, it is in-
sufficiently severable from the employee to be capable of per-
forming the policing function that the law expects of it. 
A. The Confidential Information Free-For-All 
Suits alleging interests in business-planning, customer-related 
or other "confidential" information are perhaps the most com-
mon amongst modern noncompete cases. This is not surprising 
given that modern companies frequently are unable to point to 
specific trade secrets of the traditional secret recipe variety asso-
ciated with manufacturing industries. 54 Under the existing doc-
trinal scheme, information-producing or service-oriented 
companies seeking to assert a protectable interest must rely on 
some type of financial or business-related data, what might be 
thought of as a "soft" trade secret. Notwithstanding the preva-
lence and arguable importance of the confidential information 
category, however, an examination of recent case law suggests 
that courts have embraced no clear rule regarding what informa-
tion can be legally classified as confidential and have taken very 
different approaches to determining whether an employee's ac-
cess to information justifies enforcement of a noncompete. 
Courts almost invariably treat the question of whether there is 
a protectable interest in confidential information as a matter of 
state common law. This makes sense given that state statutes re-
54 On the movement from a manufacturing to a service-oriented economy, see 
generally STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG ET AL., NEw RuLEs FOR A NEw EcoNoMY: 
EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1-3 (1998) and 
Anthony Carnevale & Donna Desrochers, Training in the Dilbert Economy, 53 
TRAINING & DEv. 32 (1999). Even companies that continue to provide tangible 
products often find that the underlying technologies are being developed and dis-
seminated so quickly that they lose their competitive value and trade secret status 
almost immediately. See David G. Majdali, Note, Trade Secrets Versus the Internet: 
Can Trade Secret Protection Survive in the Internet Age?, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 125, 
141-43 (2000) (surveying cases holding that information made accessible over the 
internet loses its protected status). 
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garding noncompetes generally do not specify what constitutes a 
legitimate interest, let alone provide particular guidance as to 
what falls within the "confidential information" category. 55 Sur-
prisingly, though, courts have given little attention to the more 
detailed statutory framework offered by the law of trade secrets, 
the sister interest with which confidential information is inevita-
bly paired. Trade secret law sets out rigorous criteria for invok-
ing court protection under which a plaintiff must prove the 
existence of qualifying information that derives independent eco-
nomic value from not being publicly known, plus the presence or 
likelihood of misappropriation of the secret. 56 Despite the fact 
that courts generally treat the protectable interest in confidential 
information as coextensive with employers ' interest in trade 
secrets, 57 few courts do more than recite the uniform definition 
of a trade secret in assessing the presence of a protectable inter-
est and none appear to make a genuine effort to apply its 
language . 58 
55 Onl y ten states have stat utes specifically addressing noncompetes. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1993) (Alabama); CAL Bus. & PROF. CooE §§ 16600-16602.5 
(West 1997) (Californi a); Cow . REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2001) (Colorado); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 1997) (Florida); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2) 
(West Supp. 2002) (Louisi ana); MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.774a (West 1989) 
(Michigan); N.D. CENT. CoD E § 9-08-06 (1987) (North Dakota); S.D. ComFIED 
LAws § 53-9-11 (Michi e 1990) (South Dakota); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 15.50-.52 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (Texas); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West Supp. 
2001) (Wisconsin). Only four of the ten state statutes enum erate the employer 's 
protectable interests. See Cow . R Ev. STAT.§ 8-2-113 (Colora do); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 542.335 (Florida); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2) (Loui siana) ; S.D . CODI-
FIED LAws § 53-9-11 (South D ako ta). Onl y the Louisian a stat ute purports to define 
"co nfidential " information , but it does so broadly and only in the limited context of 
appro priation of a comput er program. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2). 
56 The Uniform Trad e Secrets Act defines trade secret as "informa tion, including 
a formula, pattern, compil ation, program, device, method , technique, or process, 
that derives independent eco nomic value" from not being kn own and which is sub-
ject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); see also Economic Espion age Act of 1996 
§ lOl(a) , 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (definin g "tra de secre t" to include 
"financial , business, scien tific, technical, economic , or engineering infor mation " that 
has independent economic value and which the owner tak es reaso nab le measures to 
keep secre t). 
5? See Bus . Intellig ence Servs. , Inc . v. Hudson , 580 F. Supp . 1068, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (looking to trad e secret definition to determine enforceability of noncompete 
prohibiting disclosur e of confidenti al information). 
58 This is a problem not only in noncompete cases , but in the law of trade secrets 
generally, which is due at least in part to the ambiguity inherent in creating a worka-
ble definition of the ter m. See Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of 
Employment, l U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 114 (1998) (noting courts' refusal to 
define trade secrets and doubtin g whether a meaningful definition could be set 
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This absence of legal guidance has resulted in a free-for-all as 
to what confidential information actually is and whether it is suf-
ficiently present in any instance to justify enforcement of a 
noncompete. In some cases, courts have read the category gen-
erously with seeming deference to the employer's own character-
ization of the information as confidential. For instance, in 
Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc. v. Software Arti-
sans, Inc. ,59 a case involving both noncompete and trade secret 
claims, an employee responsible for developing data processing 
software left midproject to establish his own company with sev-
eral former employees. He soon developed a competing data 
processing program. 60 On CTI's subsequent trade secret claim, 
the court analyzed the employer's computer programs and their 
components and concluded that no trade secret interest had been 
demonstrated. 61 It found that CTI had failed to show that the 
database organization, its access techniques, or its identifiers 
were not publicly available. 62 It further concluded that the ar-
rangement and interaction of these functions within the em-
ployer's programs were common to all computer programs of the 
same type and therefore established no protectable trade secret 
interest even when considered as a composite. 63 
Having dismissed the trade secret claim, however, the court 
went on to conclude that the employer had demonstrated a legiti-
mate interest in confidential information justifying enforcement 
of the employee's noncompete. 64 Without any explanation of the 
applicable legal standard, the court cursorily concluded that "[ a ]s 
the individual primarily responsible for the design, development, 
marketing and sale of CTI's software, [the employee] became in-
timately familiar with every aspect of CTI's operation, and neces-
sarily acquired information that he could use to compete with 
forth); Gilson, supra note 3, at 599 (suggesting courts' reluctance to more carefully 
define "trade secret" is attributable to imprecision in the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act). 
59 3 F.3d 730, 732-34 (4th Cir. 1993). 
60 Id. at 734. 
61 Id. at 737. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. In addition, the court noted that even if CTI had established a trade secret, 
there was insufficient evidence of misappropriation. See id. (dismissing as mere cir-
cumstantial evidence the fact that the competitor program was developed quickly 
and without documentation). 
64 Id. at 739. 
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CTI in the marketplace." 65 The only additional explanation or 
source proffered in the opinion to support this generalized con-
clusion was the fact that the employment agreement containing 
the noncompete recited that the employee would have access to 
confidential and secret information. 66 
Such rote conclusions are typical of many cases involving the 
assertion of confidential information as a protectable interest. 
Having seemingly rejected the use of precise trade secret stan-
dards, courts have established no substitute system of rules for 
evaluating the information alleged to be protectable, and, conse-
quently, decisions finding a sufficient employer interest often ap-
pear to lack analytic rigor. The availability of careful legal 
analysis is also limited in part by the information itself and the 
fact that the employer's motivation for the use of the covenant is 
in theory the avoidance of disclosure. 67 Even under trade secret 
law, where the proof requirements are more exacting, courts 
have recognized that an employer need not enumerate all of its 
secrets to obtain protection, as doing so would compromise the 
very information it wished to protect. 68 Thus, those cases that 
discuss the confidential information that the employee possesses 
often do so only in general terms, without identifying what in 
particular justifies the restraint. 
While such cases suggest to some extent that employers have 
considerable leeway in using noncompetes, others exhibit a more 
rigorous approach. In Earth web, Inc. v. Schlack ,69 for instance, 
the court carefully parsed the responsibilities of the defendant-
employee and the information alleged to be confidential and 
concluded that the company had no protectable interest justify-
ing the enforcement of a noncompete. The case involved 
65 Id. 
66 Jd. This is consistent with the general idea that because noncompetes are the 
product of mutual consent embodied in the form of a written contract, injunctions to 
support their enforcement are less onerous, or at least less surprising, to the em-
ployee. Another way to explain the result is that the court used the noncompete to 
sidestep the difficult trade secret analysis; by enforcing the noncompete the court 
could give the employer the relief it sought without declaring the subject matter a 
true trade secret. See Stone, supra note 3, at 585 (analyzing CTI decision) . 
67 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 602; Edmund W; Kitch, The Law and Economics of 
Rights in Valuable Information , 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 691 (1980) (suggesting that 
purpose of using a noncompete is to avoid process of airing secret in open court). 
68 See Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 143, 150 (finding 
contention that company should have provided list of trade secrets "unpersuasive 
inasmuch as such a practice could have jeopardized VMI's security"). 
69 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D .N.Y. 1999). 
1186 OREGON LAW REVIEW (Vol. 80, 2001] 
Earthweb's operation of a family of Web sites offering products 
and services to information technology (IT) professionals. 70 The 
defendant, Schlack, was a vice president with editorial responsi-
bility for all content appearing on Earthweb's Web sites.71 After 
working for one year, Schlack was hired away by a provider of 
print-based IT information to develop a competitor Web site.72 
On Earthweb's motion for injunctive relief, the court initially 
found that the type of employment which Schlack had accepted 
did not fall within the precise definition of competition precluded 
by his employment agreement, and that the agreement conse-
quently could not bar him from assuming his new position. 73 
Notwithstanding this determination, the court devoted the bulk 
of its opinion to analyzing whether the noncompete would be en-
forceable if the parties had contracted to cover Schlack's new 
job. 74 In so doing, the court surveyed each source of information 
that could conceivably be deemed confidential to which Schlack 
had been exposed. 75 It considered Schlack's knowledge of 
Earthweb's business plan, contracts with licensees, and market-
ing strategy, as well as Schlack's exposure to technical informa-
tion.76 In each area, the court concluded that Schlack's 
knowledge was tangential or conceptual in nature, and therefore 
did not include Earthweb's proprietary information, or that the 
information in question was publicly available or insufficiently 
sophisticated in some other respect to rise to the level of confi-
dential information. 77 Thus, the court concluded that Earthweb 
had failed to establish a protectable interest justifying a restraint, 
and that the noncompete agreement could not have been en-
forced even if Schlack's competitive behavior had fallen within 
its parameters. 78 
While the depth of analysis exhibited in Earthweb may be 
atypical, its existence demonstrates how the absence of a consis-
70 Id. at 302. 
71 Id. at 303. 
72 Id. at 303, 306. 
73 The relevant difference between the two companies' products was that 
Earthweb derived its contents through licensing agreements with third parties 
whereas the competitor Web site contained information prepared by a staff of in-
house journalists. Id. at 306. 
74 Id. at 312-17. 
75 Id. at 313-16. 
76 Id. at 314-16. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 316. 
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tent approach to what constitutes confidential information can be 
a double-edged sword for employers seeking to enforce noncom-
petes. The seeming willingness of many courts to sanction area-
sonably drafted restrictive covenant without close examination of 
the alleged confidential information supporting it has en-
couraged an expansive lay understanding of what justifies the use 
of such an agreement. 79 In practice, noncompete agreements are 
requested with alarming frequency in employment relationships 
where the presence of confidential information is difficult to im-
agine under even the most liberal understanding of the term. 80 
Earthweb suggests that these agreements might ultimately be 
held unenforceable. Yet while the case could offer a dose of real-
ity to some employers, it is unlikely to undermine the in terrorum 
effect that the existence of such agreements has on employees, 
and the collective effect of the large number of cases employing a 
less rigorous analysis may be profound. 81 
79 See Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (praising 
defendant's explanation of confidential information as "anything not known outside 
Cybex" as a good lay definition of the legal term). 
so See Stone, supra note 3, at 586 (noting that courts no longer require the pres-
ence of a trade secret and have allowed employers to enforce covenants against a 
variety of employees including manicurists, carpet installers, and liquor delivery-
men). Other surprising examples of employees asked to sign such agreements, alleg-
edly to protect their employer's proprietary information, include bartenders, see 
Daiquiri's III on Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh, 608 So. 2d 222 (La. Ct. App. 1992), 
cosmetologists, see Carl Coiffure, Inc. v. Mourlot, 410 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1967), pest exterminators, see Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Etheridge, 582 So. 2d 
1102 (Ala. 1991), garbage collectors, see Brewer v. Tracy, 253 N.W.2d 319 (Neb. 
1977), janitors, see Royal Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976), night-watchmen, see Stein Steel & Supply Co. v. Tucker, 136 S.E.2d 355 (Ga. 
1964), and undertakers, see Folsom Funeral Serv. v. Rodgers, 372 N.E.2d 532 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1978). Similar concerns have been raised concerning the prevalence of 
training repayment agreements. See Anthony W. Kraus, Repayment Agreements for 
Employee Training Costs, 1993 LAB. L.J. 49, 49 (noting that repayment agreements 
have been used to protect employers' interests not only in sophisticated professions 
and high-tech industries, but also in connection with low-tech industrial craft train-
ing). For discussion of the use of noncompetes to protect employer investments in 
training, see Part II.B, infra. 
SI See Earth web, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (noting that a noncompete "can be a pow-
erful weapon in the hands of an employer [as) the risk of litigation alone may have a 
chilling effect on the employee"); Michael J. Hutter, Drafting Enforceable Employee 
Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Confidential BL1Siness Information: A Law-
yer's Approach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REV. 311,320 (1981) (noting that em-
ployees subject to noncompete agreements are reluctant to depart knowing their 
employment opportunities may be greatly curtailed); Sterk, supra note 31, at 410 
(observing that "by limiting the number of attractive alternatives available to an 
employee, a restrictive covenant may ... 'coerce' that employee to remain with his 
initial employer"): Sullivan, supra note 5. at 622-23 (discussing the chilling effect of 
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That is not to suggest that Earthweb offers a better approach, 
or that employer overreaching is the only concern. What may be 
most striking about Earthweb is the fact that Schlack was not an 
entry-level or semiskilled employee, but a corporate officer in-
volved to some degree in all aspects of his employer's business. 
That some portion of the knowledge Schlack acquired at 
Earthweb could legitimately be deemed proprietary would 
hardly seem to stretch the concept of a protectable interest. 
Leaving aside the difficulties it presents in application, if confi-
dential information as a category has any purpose within the 
common law analysis it must be that it captures and legitimates 
an employer interest in something less than a trade secret. 82 Al-
though trade secret law has expanded to protect some forms of 
business-planning and customer-related information, 83 it histori-
cally protected only particular processes or formulae. 84 Confi-
dential information may therefore be viewed as a more flexible 
basis for invoking noncompete protection which embraces less 
noncompetes on employees); cf Victoria A. Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to 
Prevent Departing Employees from Putting Your Trade Secrets to Work for Your 
Competitors, 8 CoMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 301, 309 (1992) (suggesting employers' use 
of confidentiality agreements keeps employees from leaving and guides their future 
actions). 
82 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 605 (suggesting that noncompetes may provide an 
added measure of protection in situations where intellectual property law does not 
clearly embrace employers' asserted property interests) (quoting J. Charles 
Mokriski, Trade Secrets: Protect Your Competitive Edge-Or Perish, MAss. LAW. 
WKLY., May 30, 1994, at 33); Hutter, supra note 81, at 324-25 (noting that customer 
lists, or other confidential business information that employee had access to, which 
does not rise to the level of a trade secret may still be protected under noncompete 
law). However, some scholars have critiqued this view arguing that noncompete 
protection should be limited to those instances in which a true trade secret is at 
stake. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 98 (1981); Phillip J Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, 
Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Cove-
nants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531,541 (1984). 
83 See Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624,630 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding 
that trade secrets include information dealing with new equipment, manufacturing 
costs, processes such as pricing structures, sales training, projected product release 
dates and life spans, and profit margins); Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 
1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding the existence of a trade secret in Pepsico's methods of 
pricing, distributing, and marketing its sports drink). 
84 See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Nat'! Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 
742 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting that trade secrets exist "in a combination of characteristics 
and components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified 
process, design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competi-
tive advantage"); see also Kitch, supra note 67, at 690 (suggesting that trade secret 
law's coverage overwhelmingly deals with "process technology-how to make 
something"). 
Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age 1189 
tangible information and composite knowledge gained from em-
ployment. To the extent the Earthweb court was looking for a 
smoking gun in the form of a customer list, marketing plan, or 
specific piece of software, it may have missed the forest for the 
trees. 
Cases like Earthweb and CTI exhibit both a difference in ana-
lytic approach and a tension within the law. In holding the em-
ployer to the line, Earthweb was acting consistently with the 
underlying assumption that employee access to tangible, discrete 
proprietary information is a requirement of proof that, if present, 
will ensure the employer is not impermissibly attempting to re-
strain the individual employee. Yet cases like CTI implicitly rec-
ognize that n.ot all proprietary information can be easily captured 
or defined, and suggest that an employer may have a justifiable 
interest in an employee's composite or abstract knowledge 
gained on the job. While such an interest makes intuitive sense, 
particularly in light of the type of work many service employees 
perform in an information-driven economy, it seriously jeopar-
dizes the long-standing distinction between information and indi-
vidual that the law of noncompete enforceability has historically 
embraced as a means of keeping the underlying policy concerns 
in balance. 
B. The Trouble with Training 
This problem of delineating the boundaries of confidential in-
formation leads inevitably to larger questions about the relation-
ship between noncompete law and the ownership of human 
capital. The difficulty presented by the competing approaches 
described above can be cast as a problem of the inseparability of 
knowledge from the people who possess it. Implicit in the cur-
rent legal approach to enforceability is the assumption that the 
value of protectable information must lie outside any individual's 
interpretation or implementation of the knowledge in question. 
This is to ensure that the employer's goal is to contain the infor-
mation itself rather than those employees who use it. In trade 
secret law, the concept of such a distinction between worker and 
work product is imbedded in the requirement that information 
have "independent" economic value to be legally protectable. 85 
85 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) 
(defining trade secret as one that "derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
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Thus, an employer pursuing a trade secret claim may be called on 
to show that the knowledge in question can be applied in con-
texts other than the employer's business in order to obtain an 
injunction. 86 
Such independent value would in most cases be present where 
the dispute involved a traditional trade secret, like a secret 
formula or process, that could be used competitively by any 
other business that happened to obtain it. Moving up the ladder 
of abstraction, however, value increasingly derives not from in-
formation as raw data but from its application in particular con-
texts.87 A company's ability to effectively utilize confidential 
business or customer-related information rests largely on the 
competency and skills of its employees, who in turn often obtain 
their expertise from the experience and training provided to 
them on the job. In such cases it is human capital, or knowledge 
imbedded in people, that comprises the employer's interest 
rather than data or information in the traditional sense. 88 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use"). 
86 See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Brantjes, 891 F. Supp. 432, 438 (N.D. Ill. 
1994) (rejecting employer's trade secret claim because "the information [employee] 
obtained during his employment with [employer], which ended in 1990, [was] so 
outdated that it lack[ed] current economic value"); George S. May Int'l v. Int'] 
Profit Assocs., 628 N.E.2d 647, 653-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (rejecting trade secret 
claim because employer failed to prove that its manuals, software, and financial in-
formation had "economic value to both its owner and its competitors"); cf. Relig-
ious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Int'l v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 
1989) (holding that scientologists' church scriptures appropriated by competitor 
church did not constitute trade secrets because the church did not prove the scrip-
tures gave them an economic advantage over competitors). 
87 See Kitch, supra note 67, at 711-12 (noting that detailed knowledge of one ap-
plication could prove valueless to employee who defects to competitor that uses 
entirely different systems). Indeed, Kitch suggests one way companies can protect 
valuable information is to compartmentalize the production process so individual 
employees' knowledge of their employer's procedures is limited to familiarity with 
their specific job or unit. Id. at 712. 
88 This type of information has been called "tacit" knowledge, referring to the 
skill and experience required for effectively creating and implementing an idea as 
opposed to the resulting innovation. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 577 n.10. Value 
deriving from tacit knowledge and human capital has been increasingly emphasized 
in the business management literature of the last decade and is particularly impor-
tant to high-tech and other new economy companies whose "products" are knowl-
edge-based. See PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, VALUE-DRIVEN INTELLECJ'UAL CAPITAL 
13-16 (2000) (describing origin and development of concept of intellectual capital in 
business management field from 1980s to present); KARL ERIK SvEIBY, THE NEw 
ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 3-8 (1997) (demonstrating high proportion of intangible 
corporate assets to market value for major global companies including high-tech 
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For this reason cases involving employer-provided training and 
on-the-job experience present a significant challenge to the as-
sumptions underlying noncompete law and the rules governing 
enforceability. To the extent that the value of information is 
wrapped up in the quality of its implementation, employer-pro-
vided training and exposure are necessary components to creat-
ing the competitive advantage that the employer will ultimately 
wish to protect. They also have concrete value to the employer 
in that they are generally provided at some cost.89 At the same 
time, however, training and on-the-job exposure create value for 
the individual employee in terms of the resulting increase in his 
or her own skills, knowledge, and marketability. Since these 
qualities are indistinct from the employee, fundamental princi-
ples of noncompete law dictate that an employer cannot have a 
protectable interest based on the provision of training or an em-
ployee's experience because it is akin to recognizing an employer 
interest in restraining the individual. 
Traditionally, courts have managed this tension by applying 
the confidential information concept in cases where an em-
ployer's interest rests in whole or in part on training. While the 
provision of generalized training alone cannot form the basis of 
an enforceable noncompete, a protectable interest may be 
demonstrated where the training is "extraordinary" or so highly 
specialized that it itself constitutes a form of confidential infor-
mation that would otherwise be protected. 90 The distinction is in 
theory based on the type of information transmitted to the em-
ployee in the training process. In Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Maleki ,91 
for instance, the employee was a neophyte electrical engineer 
who had been hired by a research and development facility to 
translate mathematical algorithms into a standard computer lan-
guage. The employee had been hired straight out of college, ap-
parently without any relevant prior experience, and was placed 
businesses); Gilson, supra note 3, at 594-95 (noting that the intellectual property of 
high-tech firms is usually informal in character and embedded in human capital). 
89 This is frequently the case even if no formalized training is provided because 
the employer may pay the employee more than his or her worth during the period in 
which the employee is learning the job. See infra Part III.8.1. 
90 See Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188, 194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991 ); 
Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623,627 (Utah 1982); Voorhees v. Guyan Mach. Co., 446 
S.E.2d 672, 677 (W. Va. 1994). Two state statutes specifically list specialized training 
as a protectable interest. See CoLo. REv. STAT.§ 8-2-113 (2001) (Colorado); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 1997) (Florida). 
91 765 F. Supp. 402,403 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
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under the tutelage of one or more senior employees in order to 
gain the requisite programming skills.92 He ultimately left to be-
come a programmer at another research and development facil-
ity.93 On the employer's subsequent action, the court rejected 
the argument that the employer's provision of training justified 
enforcement of the employee's noncompete agreement. 94 The 
court emphasized that the employee had merely learned to use a 
nonproprietary computer language that was used by companies 
nationwide. 95 The employee was never taught the significance of 
the algorithms he translated, which were generated by the com-
pany's scientists. 96 Drawing a distinction between "skills" and 
"secrets," the court concluded that knowledge of the computer 
language was a general skill in which the employer could have no 
legitimate competitive interest. 97 
Thus, the Kelsey-Hayes court treated training as a subset of the 
interest in trade secrets and confidential information. Absent a 
showing that the employer-provided training transmitted propri-
etary information, the covenant failed to meet the protectable 
interest threshold and was deemed unenforceable. 98 It is signifi-
cant that within such an analysis, the cost to the employer of pro-
viding the training has little bearing on whether the employer's 
interest is protectable. Since the proper inquiry is whether confi-
dential information has been transmitted, it has been held that 
even where the employer expends funds to support formalized 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 404. 
94 Id. at 407. 
95 Id. at 405-06. 
96 Id. at 406. 
97 Id. at 407-08; see also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 620 
N.E.2d 479, 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding no protectable interest in employer 
training employee to authenticate rare coins by a general process used in the indus-
try); Brunner v. Hand Indus., 603 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no 
interest in employer's provision of training in polishing orthopedic equipment using 
a nonunique process); Tom James Co. v. Mendrop, 819 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. App. 
1991) (finding that measuring methods and tools used in custom tailored men's 
clothing business were general in nature and not specific enough to justify 
protection). 
98 Kelsey-Hayes Co., 765 F. Supp. at 407; see also Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 
579 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that employee's training was 
not protected but could have been if employer's knowledge and methods constituted 
trade secrets or other confidential information); Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 
596 A.2d 188, 193-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding no protectable interest because 
"no such specialized training or sales and marketing techniques were in fact con-
veyed to [employees] during their employment at Thermo-Guard"). 
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training, such expenditures are insufficient to support a noncom-
pete if the employee gains only generalized knowledge or experi-
ence.99 However, in deciding the case in favor of the employee 
in Kelsey-Hayes, the court made a point of noting that the cost of 
providing computer language training to the defendant-employee 
was negligible. The employer had provided no formalized in-
struction, and the employee gained most of his knowledge either 
on the job or by consulting publicly available instruction books 
that were provided to him. 100 
Indeed, despite the distinction between general skills training 
and proprietary information, there appears to be growing judicial 
sensitivity to employer claims based on costly investments in 
training and development of employees, regardless of the charac-
ter of the training provided. 101 This is particularly striking in 
cases involving less skilled employees who would be unlikely to 
access business secrets in the training process. In Borg-Warner 
Protective Services Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 102 for instance, the 
employees worked as security guards for Guardsmark, a com-
pany that provided private security services to various clients, in-
cluding the Gap retail stores. The employer utilized an extensive 
screening process in recruiting and hiring guards, which involved 
the assessment of a twenty-eight-page application and numerous 
background checks. 103 Once hired, each employee received gen-
eral safety training and underwent an eighty-hour on-the-job 
training process in which the employee received instruction from 
99 See Landpoint Surveys, Inc. v. Stockwell, No. CA99-1022, 2000 WL 1586348, at 
*3-4 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000) (holding that sending employee to a two-day 
seminar in Houston to learn how to be a GPS technician was not evidence of ex-
traordinary or specialized training); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 
598 (La. 1974) (finding that expense of furnishing the employee with training at 
Orkin's Manager Training School was not enough to validate covenant where em-
ployee learned only general managerial skills); Diesel Driving Acad., Inc. v. Ferrier, 
563 So. 2d 898, 905 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "even if the claimed expenses 
were substantial in amount, most of the expenses were for the type of training that 
consistently has been found legally insufficient to support enforcement of an agree-
ment not to compete"). 
100 Kelsey-Hayes Co., 765 F. Supp. at 406-07. 
101 See, e.g., Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest, 506 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting that '"[i)n determining the legitimacy of the interest the employer 
seeks to protect, the court will take into account the employe[r)'s time and monetary 
investment in the employee's skill and development of his craft"') (quoting Beck-
man v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ga. 1982)); see generally Kraus, 
supra note 80, at 51 (noting this trend). 
102 946 F. Supp. 495, 496 (E.D. Ky. 1996). 
103 Jd. at 496. 
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a supervisor at the facility where he or she would be assigned to 
work. 104 
When a second security company, Borg-Warner, obtained the 
Gap contract, it attempted to hire the guards that Guardmarks 
had trained and stationed at the Gap store. 105 In Guardsmark's 
subsequent suit to enforce the guards' noncompete agreements, 
the court recognized that the security guards were employed in 
low-level positions that did not involve the use of extraordinary 
skills or the provision of unique services. 106 Notwithstanding , the 
court found in favor of Guardsmark based on a "more modern 
approach," emphasizing the costliness of the employer's invest-
ment in hiring and training. 107 Drawing on cases involving the 
appropriation of customer contact information and business 
goodwill, the court noted that Guardsmark's training familiarized 
the employees with the particular security requirements of the 
client's site and afforded the guards the opportunity to learn the 
client's culture. 108 The court did not suggest that this information 
was proprietary. 109 Rather, the court appeared persuaded by the 
fact that the employer had devoted significant time and money to 
recruiting and training its employees, creating a windfall for the 
new security company, which would be spared a comparable lay-
out.110 It concluded that Guardsmark was particularly vulnera-
ble to having its experienced employees "'opportunistically 
appropriated'" by competitors or clients, and that the employer 
had a legitimate interest in protecting itself contractually from 
the loss of that '"work product. "' 111 
Such analysis largely defies the distinction between general 
skills training and the acquisition of specialized information re-
quired for a legitimate interest in training under the traditional 
104 Id. at 496-97. Guardsmark did not charge the Gap for the first two weeks of a 
new guard's placement at its facility during which time this training was provided. 
Id.at 497. 
10s Id. 
106 Id. at 501-02. 
107 Id. at 501. 
108 Id. at 502. 
109 It seems implausible to assert that the guards ' knowledge of the Gap facility 
could constitute confidential information even under the broad approach previously 
discussed . See supra Part II.A . 
110 See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. , 946 F. Supp . at 502 (noting that the 
two week on-the-job training and the employees' familiarity with the culture of the 
client's firm made Guardsmark "vulnerable to disinterm ediation"). 
111 Id. at 502 (quoting Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Group. 720 
F.2d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
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doctrine. By enforcing the security guards' noncompetes, the 
court recognized that even generalized training may be protect-
able where it is costly to the employer and hence valuable to the 
competition. More importantly, in equating the trained security 
guards with the employer's work product, the court implicitly 
abandoned the assumption that an employer's interests must be 
distinct from its employees in order to be protected. In so doing, 
the court recognized that in some circumstances the employees 
themselves are assets of the company. 
The potential implications of such an approach can be seen in 
Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., a case involving a nonpiracy 
clause. In Balasco, a former sales manager of the Courtesy car 
dealership hired away several sales personnel to work at a com-
petitor dealership in contravention of the manager's employment 
contract. 112 It was the employer's practice to hire personnel with 
little or no sales experience and "invest[ ] considerable money 
and time to teach them the Courtesy way of selling cars" utilizing 
both in-house and outside trainers. 113 There was no allegation 
that the training consisted of proprietary information, nor any 
articulated claim that the personnel in question had acquired any 
client goodwill from their experience or training. Notwithstand-
ing, the court concluded that the parties' "agreement was neces-
sary to protect the substantial investment Courtesy makes in 
specialized training for its sales staff," and further that the agree-
ment protected the "legitimate business interests of promoting 
productivity and maintaining a competent and specialized sales 
team." 114 Thus, the court recognized not only the employer's in-
terest in protecting its investment in nonproprietary training, but 
seemingly went further to suggest that the employer had an inter-
est simply in retaining an effective staff. 
Although the enforcement of a nonpiracy clause is less damag-
ing to the employee than the enforcement of a noncompete 
agreement, 115 the apparent expansion of the legitimate interest 
112 Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
113 Id. According to the employer, it took up to six months to develop their raw 
recruits into effective sales personnel. Id. 
114 /d. 
115 Such a clause does not prevent the employee from earning a living, only from 
soliciting other employees of clients to join his or her competitive pursuit. See, e.g., 
Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (1999) 
(holding that "(employee's] agreement not to solicit (employer's] clients was not an 
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concept in Balasco is one that could be drawn in any case involv-
ing a noncompete under similar facts.116 The employer in 
Balasco apparently had no identifiable interest in information, 
but, in the words of the court, had demonstrated a legitimate in-
terest in the quality of its personnel. In this way, cases that relax 
the confidential information requirement to permit an interest in 
costly, but not proprietary, training pave the way for greater judi-
cial recognition of employees as protectable corporate assets, 
fundamentally undercutting the distinction between worker and 
work product on which the current law rests. 
Indeed, the rigid division between permissible and impermissi-
ble interests may well be collapsing. While the difference be-
tween information that is and is not confidential may be difficult 
to draw, the training cases suggest that the distinction between 
people and information is even more elusive. Cases like Borg-
Warner and Balasco bring this confusion to a head because they 
do not involve "information" in the obvious sense of the word, 
but rather the transmission of skills, experience, and composite 
knowledge, the value of which is inextricably bound up with the 
employees themselves. Yet the complexity of such cases rests on 
more than mere linedrawing. It would be possible to dismiss 
these decisions as outliers, contrary to existing doctrine and over-
stepping the bounds of policy in recognizing novel employer in-
terests, but for the fact that their results seem somehow fair. The 
significance of Borg-Warner and Balasco may well be that, de-
spite the public policy rhetoric, there are instances in which em-
ployers legitimately have an interest in retaining qualified 
workers, and enforcing a noncompete to protect such interests 
does not violate fundamental principles of worker protection. If 
that is the case, then the doctrine's implicit reliance on the 
worker/work product distinction not only creates difficulties in 
illegal agreement not to compete, as it in no way precluded him from pursuing his 
vocation, but rather was a reasonable and enforceable anti-piracy provision"). 
116 Courts generally find that non-solicitation, non-disclosure, and antipiracy 
clauses are governed by the same law as noncompete agreements. See, e.g. , Sevier 
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Birmingham, 711 So. 2d 995, 998 (Ala. 
1998) (holding that state statute limiting contracts in restraint of trade applied to 
employment agreements irrespective of whether they were classified as covenants 
not to compete or as nonsolicitation agreements); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & 
Co., 732 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (using the same general law of 
restrictive covenants to enforce agreement precluding disclosure of confidential in-
formation, solicitation of employer's clients and employees, and competition with 
employer for three years after employment). 
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application, but also misconceives the purpose of the protectable 
interest requirement. If an employer-asserted interest in the 
value of a particular worker can be justified in instances where 
that value is the result of employer investment, then the absence 
of discrete secret information is not an effective proxy for deter-
mining when the use of a noncompete offends public policy. To 
the extent the protectable interest approach continues to envi-
sion an easy division between people and their work products, 
the current legal test will necessarily be both over- and under-
inclusive in identifying appropriate uses of these agreements. 
III 
ENGINEERING WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIPS: A 
REVISED DESCRIPTION OF EMPLOYER 
INTERESTS AND THE WORKER 
PROTECTION PROBLEM 
The previous section demonstrates that the protectable inter-
est concept is functionally unworkable and, in many cases, fails to 
describe accurately the interests of contemporary employers. As 
a result, employers seeking enforcement must pigeonhole their 
actual interests into one of the preexisting categories, most often 
the confidential information category, resulting in various con-
tortions of the doctrine and eroding the predictive value of ex-
isting case law. More importantly, because the doctrine is rooted 
in policy opposing efforts to restrain individual workers, its fair-
ness inquiry is misdirected. The focus on the presence or absence 
of a protectable interest precludes investigation into whether ef-
forts to retain workers may in fact be legitimate and whether, by 
contrast, such efforts might indicate employer overreaching. 
The following section seeks to understand this distinction be-
tween proper and improper restraints on workers in the context 
of the modern employment relationship. Crucial to such an anal-
ysis is a consideration of the way employers operate in an econ-
omy that has changed significantly in the last several decades. 
Thus, the section begins with a brief overview of the changing 
work environment. It then recharacterizes the interest underly-
ing employers' use of noncompetes as an interest in people 
rather than in discrete information. In light of the current work-
place dynamic, employers are inclined to use noncompetes as a 
means both of protecting investments in training and policing 
employee loyalty and commitment. While that behavior may be 
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acceptable in some instances, it is also subject to abuse. The sec-
tion suggests that noncompete agreements give employers the 
best of the old employment regime and the new workplace in the 
form of a legal midway point between term employment and em-
ployment at will. It is the employer's discretion to use noncom-
petes to enforce its own conception of the parties' social contract 
of employment that poses challenges for noncompete doctrine 
and workplace policy. 
A. The New Workplace in the New Economy 
An analysis of the forces motivating employers' increased reli-
ance on noncompete agreements starts with an examination of 
the new workplace and how it departs from prior models of the 
employer-employee relationship. 117 The modern employment 
relationship has undergone a profound change in the last twenty 
years. The secure, long-term employment relationships associ-
ated with an earlier era are largely obsolete today, having been 
replaced with a variety of short-term employment arrangements: 
Companies are increasingly outsourcing work and relying on 
contingent, part-time and other flexible work models. 118 From 
the perspective of employees, job tenure is in decline and job 
hopping is commonplace. 119 
These aspects of the modern workplace, while not revolution-
ary, 120 represent a significant break from the model of employ-
117 The concept of a "new workplace" and recent changes in the implicit under-
standing between workers and employers have received attention from a variety of 
academic disciplines , including law, see , e.g ., Stone, supra note 3, at 522; Hyde , 
supra note 58, at 101-02 (1998) , sociology, see , e.g., RICHARD SENNETT, THE CoR-
Ros1ON OF CHARACfER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW 
CAPITALISM (1998), and business management, see, e.g., PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW 
DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET DRIVEN WORKFORCE 17 (1999); 
HERZENBERG ET AL, supra note 54, at 12-14. Thus, this section draws on literature 
from multiple fields in describing these developments. 
118 See Stone, supra note 3, at 539-41 (reviewing statistics on growth of temporary 
agencies and use of part-time employees and independent contractors). Professor 
Stone refers to this segment of the workforce as the "precariously " employed , a 
category which encompasses all workers who are employed without "any implicit or 
explicit promise of job security." Id. at 542. 
I 19 An increasing number of employees in the middle of their careers have al-
ready made several job switches . Daniel M. Gold, Switching to New Jobs, Endanger-
ing Savings , N.Y . T1MES, Jan . 17, 1999, at sec. 3, p. 10. 
120 Research suggests that the long-term employment system that is currently be-
ing overthrown is a recent and largely aberrational phenomenon that followed on 
the heels of a low job security regime similar to that which is developing today. See 
CAPPELLI, supra, note 117, at 51-57 (describing "putting-out " labor system of nine-
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ment that was in place for much of the last century. During the 
decades preceding the boom in the services industries, employ-
ment relationships reflected a particular style of labor manage-
ment that evolved in manufacturing industries. Typical of this 
approach were sharply differentiated job descriptions embracing 
distinct skills, close supervision and internal training of employ-
ees by middle management, and hierarchical but well-defined 
ladders for promotion and advancement. 121 Although positions 
within such structures tended to be low skill, employers success-
fully combated the problem of turnover and low morale by mak-
ing tacit promises of long-term job security, by providing 
progressive wage increases, and by offering an array of benefits 
and services. 122 Thus, the model of implicit lifetime employment 
within a single company became the norm. 
In recent years, however, employment practices have dramati-
cally altered in response to a variety of economic changes. Since 
the mid-twentieth century, the economy has moved from one pri-
marily dependent on traditional industries and the manufactur-
ing of hard goods to one in which information management and 
other service-sector jobs predominate. 123 The routinization and 
structure associated with manufacturing cannot easily be im-
posed on the work performed by employees within these indus-
tries.124 More importantly, technological advances in 
communication and the resulting globalization of the economy 
teenth century as characterized by flat organizational structure, significant auton-
omy among low-level workers, and extensive reliance on independent contractors 
and other forms of outsourcing). 
121 See id. at 59-64 (describing characteristics of labor management systems initi-
ated by Alfred Taylor, Henry Ford, and Frederick Taylor during mid-twentieth cen-
tury); SENNE"IT, supra note 117, at 39-45 (describing Fordism and the routinization 
of work): Stone, supra note 3. at 529-32 (describing "scientific management" ap-
proach to labor management). 
122 See Stone, supra note 3. at 532. 
123 Service sector jobs grew by thirty-six million between 1959 and 1999, such jobs 
comprising approximately forty-one percent of American jobs and providing ap-
proximately fifty percent of total United States earnings in 1999. See Carnevale & 
Desrochers, supra note 54, at 32-33. The percentage of the workforce in services 
industries surpassed that in goods and manufacturing in the early 1950s. See 
HERZENBERG ET AL., supra note 54, at 2-3. 
124 See SENNETr, supra note 117, at 51 ( describing modern approach of "flexible 
specialization," which seeks to deliver more varied products more quickly to the 
market, as "the antithesis of the system of production embodied in Fordism"); Car-
nevale & Desrochers, supra note 54, at 33 (noting that unlike manufacturing, in 
which success was measured by the achievement of high volume at low cost. success 
in the new economy demands more complex skills. and. consequently. more com-
plex performance standards). 
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have led to increased competition and the need for greater flexi-
bility within companies. 125 Employers must be capable of alter-
ing business strategies and production capabilities with minimal 
lead time in order to meet fluctuating market demands and are 
therefore unable to promise employees long-term employment 
along defined career paths. 126 Instead, employers are hiring 
skilled employees who can meet their immediate goals and are 
then replacing or redirecting those workers when their needs 
change. 127 Thus, employees today can anticipate frequent lateral 
moves both between and within companies and departments 
over the course of their careers. 128 
These changes in the economy and the workplace have altered 
the expectations of employees and employers about the nature of 
their relationship, what is often referred to as the "social" or 
12s See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 4-5 (attributing recent changes in work prac-
tices to , among other things , increasingly competitive product markets and pressures 
to create market niches) ; SENNETr, supra note 117, at 52 (positing that "[t)he most 
strongly flavored ingredient in th[e] new productive process is the willingness to let 
the shifting demands of the outside world determine the inside structure of institu-
tions"); Stone, supra note 3, at 549 (noting significance of increased trade and global 
competition and pressures to achieve short-term cost reduction in explaining con-
temporary labor manag ement trends). 
126 See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 5 (noting that such competition reduces mar-
ket lead time, making long-term investments impractical for companies); Stewart J. 
Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market 
Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 31 (2001) (predicting firms will be increasingly reluctant to 
hire specialized workers under implicit long-term contracts due to risk that skills will 
become superfluous in changing global market). 
127 See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 49 (1999) . This trend is reflected in the con-
temporary practice of downsizing despite profitability and favorable conditions. 
Whereas downsizing was historically a response of last resort to declines in business 
and economic downturns , a growing number of contemporary layoff initiatives are 
attributed to restructuring and outsourcing efforts designed to enhance productivity. 
See id. at 116-17 (summ arizing findings in AM. MGMT. A ss 'N, 1994 AMA SURVEY 
ON DOWNSIZING: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDING (1994)) ; FREDERICK F. REICHHELD, 
THE LOY AL TY EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND GROWTH, PROFITS, AND 
LASTING VALUE 94-95 (1996). 
128 Professor Stone refers to this employment trajectory as the "boundaryless ca-
reer. " Stone , supra note 3, at 553-54. A quintessential example is the employment 
pattern that predominated amon g high-tech employees in California 's Silicon Valley 
during the late 1990s. See Hyd e , supra note 3. However , the phenomenon exists in 
a ll sectors of the economy . A 1995 study of leading companies found that manage-
rial positions had a life time expectancy of three to four years , meaning that such jobs 
were designed with the expectation that the employee would leave within that time 
frame . See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 115 (summarizing findings in CORPORATE 
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, PERFECl"ING LABOR MARKETS: R EDEFINING THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT AT THE WORLD'S HIGH-PERFORMANCE CORPORATIONS (1995)). 
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"psychological" contract of employment. 129 Previously employ-
ers and employees implicitly understood at the outset of their 
relationship that the employee's career development within the 
company would proceed along a predesignated path: The em-
ployee who performed adequately and demonstrated loyalty and 
commitment to the company would be rewarded with a lifetime 
job with steady pay and periodic advancement through an ex-
isting hierarchy_l3° Thus, the employee could safely invest in ac-
quiring firm-specific skills and rely on the company to manage 
his or her career development. Now, the market has in effect 
replaced the employer's own rules and policies for controlling its 
labor force. Since employers cannot predict how changes in the 
market will alter their labor needs, they are essentially encourag-
ing employees to benchmark their professional development 
against the demands of the industry as a whole rather than in 
relation to the internal hierarchy of the company itself. 131 The 
new understanding between employers and employees is that, 
129 Such an understanding is not a contract in the legal sense, but rather refers to 
the underlying, often unspoken, expectations of the parties. See CAPPELLI, supra 
note 117, at 21 (distinguishing psychological contracts from legal contracts as agree-
ments arising from individual perceptions of appropriate behavior not tied to any 
formal written document); Stone, supra note 3, at 549-50 (characterizing psychologi-
cal contract as the belief in the existence of a reciprocal exchange creating mutual 
obligations); Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America's Social Contract in Em-
ployment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and Practices, 75 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 137, 
137 (1999). For an explanation of how such contracts develop and their effect on 
workplace behavior from an organizational psychology perspective, see Denise M. 
Rosseau, Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations, 2 EMPLOYEE RESP. 
& RTs. J. 121, 123-29 (1989). 
13D See CAPPELLI, supra note 117 at 21 ("The psychological contract that accom-
panied the lifetime corporate employment model represented an exchange of job 
security and predictable advancement for loyalty and good performance."). Signifi-
cantly, employers frequently acknowledge such implicit understandings and conform 
their behavior to comply with their terms even in the absence of a legal obligation to 
do so. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms 
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1917 (1996) (noting 
how corporate norms, such as limiting discharge to for-cause situations and retaining 
older workers despite declining performance, coexist with inconsistent doctrinal rule 
of employment at will). 
131 See John Case, The Question We All Wonder About: "For Whom Do You 
Work?", BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1993, at 44 ("[I]n today's new economy, we work 
for ourselves simply because we can no longer count on the benevolence of the 
organizations that issue those paychecks."). This phenomenon has been described 
as the substitution of external market solutions for the internal labor markets gov-
erned by employer-generated rules and policies. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 
viii; Schwab, supra note 126, at 31-32; see generally Rock & Wachter, supra note 
130, at 1915 n.6 (defining the internal labor market as the network of arrangements, 
understandings, and agreements that constitute the employment relationship within 
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rather than grooming employees for internal promotion, employ-
ers will offer employees work experience that will keep them 
marketable to other employers in the event that they are termi-
nated.132 Thus, the employer's promise of long-term employ-
ment has been replaced by a promise of employability, and the 
new understanding is that the employee's lifelong relationship 
will be with the market rather than the company. 
B. Noncompetes and the Employer's "People" Interest 
This landscape poses obvious challenges for employees who 
must monitor their career development against changing de-
mands and the chronic risk of losing their jobs. However, it also 
poses significant difficulties for the employer who must ensure 
access to a pool of qualified workers while having little ability to 
forecast its needs. Because the common law system of employ-
ment at-will places no limitations on the parties' ability to termi-
nate their relationship, employers risk losing competent 
employees to their competitors. Thus, in a tight labor market, 
where highly skilled employees are scarce, companies may view 
noncompetes as a means of protecting one of their most impor-
tant assets: their workers. This subsection offers a justification 
for that use in economic and sociological terms. As explained 
below, employers' use of noncompetes can be characterized as a 
means of securing the employer's investment in employee devel-
opment, or as enforcing a new "social" contract of employment 
that envisions an exchange of training and experience for spot 
commitments to particular projects and goals. 
1. Protecting Investments in Human Capital 
Since much of the value of high-tech and service-oriented com-
panies lies in the thoughts, skills, and creativity of their employ-
ees, the success of these companies depends on their ability to 
firms as distinguished from the external employment market in which firms seek to 
fill vacancies and workers search for jobs). 
132 See Stone, supra note 3, at 569 (describing Rosabeth Moss Kanter's recom-
mended model for offering workers "employability security" in place of employ-
ment security) (citing RosABETH Moss KANTER, ROSABETH Moss KANTER ON THE 
FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 190-94 (1997)); Hal Lancaster, A New Social Contract 
to Benefit Employer and Employee, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at Bl (suggesting 
employees should look to their current employers to provide satisfying work. learn-
ing opportunities, and career management skills rather than long-term security along 
defined career paths). 
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harness and develop human capital. 133 Yet competition for talent 
makes it difficult for employers to attract and retain qualified 
workers. Since the message employers are sending their employ-
ees encourages self-reliance and disclaims long-term employ-
ment,134 employees have little incentive to remain in any one 
employment relationship. Modem employers are therefore at 
risk of losing significant assets through voluntary attrition. 135 
This phenomenon poses a paradox to employers seeking to 
maximize their intellectual assets. While financial contributions 
to employees' professional development can augment a com-
pany's value, in practice employers may not reap the benefit of 
such investments due to employee defection. 136 In theory, the 
use of fixed-term employment contracts could resolve the prob-
lem of voluntary attrition, but such agreements pose difficulties 
of enforcement and undermine employers' efforts to achieve 
flexibility in the face of changing market demands.137 Thus, de-
spite the strategic importance of cultivating internal talent, em-
ployers may not make such investments for fear that their efforts 
133 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 585 (noting importance of information embedded 
in human capital in describing "knowledge spillover" effect that occurs when em-
ployees defect to new companies); supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra Part II.A. 
l35 The dollar cost of employee turnover, though difficult to measure, can be ex-
tremely high. See REICHHELD, supra note 127, at 96-98 (citing anecdotal evidence 
from the trucking, auto service and investment brokerage industries). One business 
management expert estimates that in the investment brokerage industry, the total 
outlay involved in bringing a new broker to profitability exceeds $100,000 and that 
for each new recruit that reaches the profitability point, two others will defect before 
yielding any return for the employer. Id. at 103-05. 
136 This reality perpetuates a "vicious cycle" in which the failure to train creates 
shortages of skilled employees, which in turn leads employers to step up efforts to 
hire experienced workers from the ranks of their competitors, which in turn reduces 
companies' incentive to train workers internally. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 
6. 
137 As a general rule, fixed-term contracts are not specifically enforceable against 
employees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 367 (1981) ("A promise to 
render personal service will not be specifically enforced."); see also Sterk, supra 
note 31, at 387-88 (describing the basis for this rule as rooted in the Thirteenth 
Amendment's protection against involuntary servitude as well as practical concerns 
about courts' ability to supervise forced job performance). Such agreements there-
fore hamstring the employer to a set term during which it must retain the employee 
without providing any guarantee that it will retain the benefit of the employee's 
services during that period. For this reason, law and economics scholars have sug-
gested that noncompetes offer an efficient alternative to fixed-term contracts. See 
Posner & Triantis, supra note 3; cf Lester. supra note 3, at 53 (suggesting noncom-
petes may "fill a gap where other legal and extra-legal mechanisms fall short"). 
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will merely aid the competition. 138 
To combat this cycle, employers may turn to noncompetes as a 
vehicle for protecting financial investments in their workers. 139 
Economics-influenced literature has historically supported the 
use of noncompetes for such purposes, recognizing that the pro-
vision of general140 training creates human capital that the em-
ployee may be inclined to sell to competitors for a profit. 141 Such 
incentives occur where the employer overpays the employee at 
the outset of the relationship, anticipating that it will recoup its 
loss by paying the employee less than his or her true worth for a 
period after training is provided. 142 During this "pay back" pe-
138 The incidence of employee poaching and mass defections legitimate this con-
cern. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 3 (discussing widely publicized trade secret lawsuit 
brought by Intel against four employees who defected to competitor Broadcom); 
Rebecca Buckman, Tech Defectors from Microsoft Resettle Together, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 16, 2000, at Bl (describing Microsoft "brain drain" resulting from teams of 
software developers defecting en masse to form "spin-off' competitor companies); 
see also CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 182-85 (describing poaching as a standard way 
for companies to meet their skills needs and discussing headline examples from high 
profile companies). 
139 This, of course, is but one of many methods available to companies seeking to 
enhance employee retention. An increasingly common approach to the problem, 
one which relies on the carrot rather than the stick, is the adoption of equity-based 
compensation plans. See generally MARGARET BLAIR, WEALTH CREATION AND 
WEALTH SHARING: A COLLOQUIUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVEST-
MENTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL (1996). But see CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 185-87 
(suggesting that "golden handcuff' compensation packages drive up labor cost with-
out effectively thwarting poaching efforts). In some instances, companies have ne-
gotiated agreements with specific competitors under which each agrees to refrain 
from recruiting employees from the other. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman, New Web 
Software Start-up Draws Microsoft Workers-and Its Ire, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 
2000, at Bl (reporting existence of anti-poaching agreement between Microsoft and 
local competitor Crossgain). 
140 Law and economics literature distinguishes between general and specific train-
ing, Specific training is unique to the particular employer who provides it, while 
general training may be useful to the current employer as well as to subsequent 
employers in the industry. See Kitch, supra note 67, at 683,684 (summarizing GARY 
S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 
1975)). In theory, specific training need not be protected by a noncompete because it 
does not create any value in the employee that another firm would seek to buy, but 
an employee with general training is likely to be in demand by other employers who 
wish to reap the benefit of the initial employer's investment. See id. 
141 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 28, at 717-18; Kitch, supra note 67, at 684-86; 
Schulman, supra note 3, at 115. 
142 Although in theory the employer would withhold the cost of training from 
wages, that is not always possible. Sometimes the training is sufficiently expensive 
that the worker cannot finance it through wages, as where the training involves the 
transmission of a trade secret. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 82, at 96-97. Alter-
natively, the labor market may be such that employees have the bargaining power to 
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riod, the employee is more valuable to companies that have not 
invested in the employee's acquisition of skills, and he or she is 
liable to defect to competitors willing to pay the salary that a 
fully trained employee can command. 143 The noncompete pro-
tects the employer from the loss that would arise in that scenario. 
This is true regardless of whether the training involves trade 
secrets or other proprietary information as required under ex-
isting law. It is the cost to the employer, and the value of that 
training to other employers in the market, that justifies the 
restraint. 144 
Although this analysis appears most applicable to a junior em-
ployee receiving formalized training at the outset of employment, 
it can also apply to the informal acquisition of new knowledge by 
more experienced employees. Formalized entry-level training is 
in decline among employers, 145 in part due to the disincentives 
described above and because changing demands make it difficult 
for employers to anticipate the skills employees will need in the 
future. 146 Therefore, the employee in the new workplace is likely 
to be learning through exposure more than through instruction. 
Even so, the employer may be overpaying the employee during 
the progression of his learning curve. As employees are thrust 
into new projects and new work teams, they gain skills and know-
how that increase their value both to their employers and the 
market. While the common law has historically viewed this type 
insist on higher wages. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 44 (noting that pressure to 
raise wages makes training difficult to fund). 
143 See Lester, supra note 3, at 62-63; Callahan, supra note 28, at 716-17; Kitch , 
supra note 67, at 685; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 82, at 97. 
144 That is not to say that the enforcement of a noncompete based on the em-
ployer's provision of training is necessarily efficient. See Lester, supra note 3, at 72-
74 (suggesting that although noncompetes can be used to encourage optimal invest-
ments, practical barriers in formation and enforcement significantly undermine their 
value); Rubin & Shedd, supra note 82, at 109-10 (recognizing economic rationale for 
use of noncompetes to protect investments in training, but concluding that the likeli-
hood of employer overreaching militates against expansion of the categories of legit-
imate employer interests). The limitations of the economic argument in support of 
enforcing noncompetes to protect investments in training are discussed more fully in 
Part III.C.2 , infra. 
145 See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 152-53 (reporting that per employee training 
expenditures dropped between 1983 and 1991 and that overall length of training has 
declined even where its incidence remains unchanged). This observation is particu-
larly true of Silicon Valley where a significant amount of what was formally in-house 
training has been outsourced to educational institutions and other external provid-
ers. See id. at 176-77. 
146 See id. at 44, 198. 
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of experiential knowledge as belonging solely to the employee, 
companies may have an ownership interest in it, at least to the 
extent of their financial investment in its acquisition. Thus, em-
ployers may use noncompetes as a way of recouping the cost of 
funded training, formal or otherwise, by ensuring that employees 
stay long enough for the employer to break even. 147 
2. Policing Loyalty and Organizational Commitment 
Another aspect of the new employment relationship that may 
influence employers' use of noncompetes to protect their interest 
in their employees is the disintegration of traditional notions of 
company loyalty. While employers as entities are profit minded, 
employers consist of individual managers and decision makers 
who have personal interests at stake in their interactions with 
employees. These interests may include the intangible benefits 
of working with particular people and the desire to continue pos-
itive workplace relationships. 148 Although such interests are not 
entirely divorced from pecuniary concerns, 149 they might usefully 
147 It should be noted that despite the value of noncompetes to individual employ-
ers using the agreement in this manner, recent scholarship suggests that, in some 
instances, employers may be better served by the information "spillover" that occurs 
in economies that tolerate frequent movement between companies than they are 
trying to protect individu al investments in workers. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 607-
09 (comparing economic development in Silicon Valley to that in Boston's high-tech 
corridor and concluding that California law prohibiting enforcement of noncompete 
agreements contributed to Silicon Valley's increased success); Hyde , supra note 3 
(attributing Silicon Valley's success to absence of noncompetes , infrequency of trade 
secret litigation, and work culture that tolerates rapid movement between jobs). As-
suming this is the case, however , in the absence of an all-out adoption of California's 
legal regime, employers will always find it in their individual interest to request 
noncompetes from their own workers. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 609 (noting col-
lective action problem posed by regime in which each employer tries to restrict mo-
bility of its workers while taking advantage of spillover from other firms). The 
scholarship in this area has yet to advocate for the adoption of California's legal 
regime in other jurisdictions. See id. at 627-29 (noting that adoption of rules prohib-
iting noncompetes must be preceded by serious study of trade-offs between enhanc-
ing knowledge spillovers and reducing incentives for initial innovation which may 
result if employer property rights are diluted) . 
148 See Macneil , Values in Contract , supra note 11, at 348-49 (discussing values of 
reciprocity and solidarity in relational contracts); Gude! , supra note 11, at 776-77 
(same). Such interests often are not considered in the economic analysis previously 
presented. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of 
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J . LEGAL STUD. 271, 278 n.13 
(1992). 
149 See REICHHELD, supra note 127, at 19-21 (advocating loyalty-based manage-
ment approach focusing on retention of customers, employees and investors as key 
to long-term value creation); Stacey Wagner, Retention: Finders, Keepers, TRAINING 
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be conceived of as the employer's interest in employee loyalty. 150 
While expectations of loyalty were a pivotal component of the 
lifelong employment regime, their significance is less clear in an 
environment where rapid movement between jobs is both antici-
pated and necessary. Some modern employers are explicitly dis-
claiming expectations of loyalty in articulating a new approach to 
their relationship with workers. 151 Such statements serve to dif-
fuse employees' lingering expectations of long-term employment, 
which the employer may ultimately be unable to meet. However, 
they also undercut employers' goal of retaining valued employ-
ees, as well as their efforts to motivate the type of above-average 
performance that will increase firm productivity. 152 
Significantly, loyalty is not a concept with a distinct legal defi-
nition in the employment context. Employers owe no freestand-
ing duty of loyalty to their employees beyond compliance with 
their contractual obligations and are obviously free to terminate 
workers at will absent an explicit contrary arrangement. While 
employees owe a duty of loyalty to their employers under tort 
law, that duty is limited to refraining from direct competition 
with the employer or otherwise acting in derogation of the em-
ployer's interests, so long as the employment relationship contin-
ues. 153 This duty has never been interpreted to regulate the 
& DEv., Aug. 1, 2000, at 64 (noting that positive working relationships and personal 
investments between employers and employees are known to improve productivity 
and profit margins). 
150 As articulated by organizational psychologists, loyalty comprises a variety of 
behaviors indicative of commitment, including emotional identification with the 
company, willingness to make personal sacrifices to advance the companies' goals or 
products, and intention to remain employed despite external opportunities. See 
Caroline Louis Cole. Building Loyalty, WORKFORCE, Aug. 2000, at 42 (summarizing 
findings of a study on worker attitudes conducted by Aon Consulting Worldwide's 
Loyalty Institute); Charles W. Mueller & Jean E. Wallace, Employee Commitment, 
WORK & OccuPATIONs, Aug. 1992, at 211. 
151 CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 25-28 (excerpting employment policy statements 
of major companies including Apple Computer, AT&T, and General Electric). 
152 Because employee creativity and teamwork are crucial to companies' success, 
employers wish to encourage innovative behavior that goes beyond bare job require-
ments. See id. at 46 (describing employer need for "extra-role" behavior by employ-
ees in new work systems which involve less employee supervision and greater 
reliance on employee initiative); REICHHELD, supra note 127, at 92 (characterizing 
desirable employees as those whose talent and self-motivation result in increased 
personal productivity and consequent surpluses for employer and customers); Stone, 
supra note 3, at 556-57 (describing employer interest in effecting "organizational 
citizenship behavior" and entrepreneurial activity). 
l53 See. e.g., Planmatics, Inc. v. Showers, 137 F. Supp. 2d 616, 626 (D. Md. 2001) 
('"(A]n employee may not solicit for himself business which his position requires 
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nature of the employee's departure from the company or to 
touch competitive conduct posttermination. Because the em-
ployer and employee may terminate their relationship at any 
time, and any greater commitments between them must be de-
fined by contract, loyalty has no legal significance in policing ei-
ther the agreed upon terms of the relationship or the 
circumstances of its termination. 154 
As a business management and human resources matter, how-
ever, loyalty is a measurable, 155 albeit intangible, component of 
the employment relationship that can create value for the organi-
zation.156 Companies have eschewed the rhetoric of loyalty in 
crafting their new deal with workers largely because it evokes the 
exchange of job security for good performance associated with 
him to obtain for his employer. He must refrain from actively and directly compet-
ing with his employer for customers and employees, and must continue to exert his 
best efforts on behalf of his employer."') (quoting Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 
382 A.2d 564,568 (Md. 1978)); Western Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 360 N.E.2d 1091, 1094 
(N.Y. 1977) (An employee is '"prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent 
with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith 
and loyalty in the performance of his duties."') (quoting Lamdin v. Broadway Sur-
face Adver. Corp., 133 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 1936)); Lamorte Bums & Co. v. Walters, 
770 A.2d 1158, 1169 (N.J. 2001) ("The duty of loyalty prohibits the employee from 
taking affirmative steps to injure the employer's business."). 
154 As in other contractual relationships, however, courts imply a duty of good 
faith in fulfilling the terms of the agreement. See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul 
Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) ("[I]n every contract there is an im-
plied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of 
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the con-
tract."). That principle may be interpreted, in certain circumstances, to prohibit un-
just termination, as where the purpose of the termination is to avoid contractual 
obligations. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989) 
(finding violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing where employer termi-
nated employee for hardship resulting from her extended absence despite fact that 
absences did not exceed the leave time permitted under company sick day policy); 
Fortune v. Nat'! Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (finding jury ques-
tion on wrongful termination claim where company terminated employee salesman 
between initiation and consummation of new sales account, thereby depriving him 
of commission otherwise entitled to under terms of written contract). 
155 There are various studies that purport to measure levels of loyalty and com-
mitment within an organization through survey questions. See, e.g., Cole, supra 
note 150, at 42; Mueller & Wallace, supra note 150, at 211. 
156 Studies suggest that committed employees demonstrate higher performance 
and lower rates of tardiness and absenteeism, as well as a greater likelihood to place 
company interests above self-interests. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 46. Loyal 
employee behavior can in tum lead to more effective selection and retention of cus-
tomers, in addition to increasing general efficiency and reducing training costs. See 
REICHHELD, supra note 127, at 100-02 (positing seven distinct economic benefits 
associated with employee loyalty). 
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the old employment regime. 157 But employers are unable to dis-
claim their desire for some level of employee commitment on 
different terms. Companies need employees who will be innova-
tive, hard-working, and loyal to their projects and their cowork-
ers.158 Such a conception of loyalty contemplates commitment to 
a particular product, work team, or project as opposed to long-
term commitment to the company itself .159 
The problem for employers, however, is how to encourage 
dedication and above-average performance while simultaneously 
telling employees they have no guarantee of continued employ-
ment and may be terminated for any reason. 160 That conundrum 
reflects the inherent limitation of an at-will system in which the 
employee has no incentive to go beyond specified job require-
ments, or even to see a job through, but where the success of the 
relationship from the employer's perspective depends on the em-
ployee's cooperation with evolving expectations and commit-
ment to advancing the company's interests over time. In effect, 
the extracontractual understanding of the old regime, the tacit 
exchange of loyalty for security, resolved this conflict from both 
ends. 161 In the absence of such an agreement, however, the sys-
tem is at odds with itself. 
For this reason, employers may turn to noncompetes as a 
means of policing a new form of organizational commitment. In-
stead of seeking company loyalty in the traditional sense, em-
ployers are now asking employees to make spot commitments to 
particular work teams and projects. In return, the employees re-
ceive marketable experience. 162 It is in effect an exchange of ere-
157 See supra Part III.A. 
158 See Stone, supra note 3, at 557 (discussing positive correlation between "affec-
tive commitment," described as the employee's identification with company goals 
and desire for company success, with high-quality job performance). 
159 Two Cheers for Loyalty, EcoNOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 49; Tom Payne, Company 
Loyalty: May it Rest in Peace, MANAGE, July 1, I 995, at 30 (suggesting that corpo-
rate loyalty is not "dead," but rather has been redefined to fit the needs of the new 
workplace). 
160 See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 13 (noting internal contradiction of the new 
workplace in which employers are seemingly demanding more from employees but 
offering less in return). 
161 See Stone, supra note 3, at 529-32 (discussing how scientific management used 
promotion hierarchies and cause-only dismissal policies to combat problems of low 
morale and high turnover). 
162 See discussion supra Part III.A. The desire for spot commitments is consistent 
with the way work is organized in the new workplace. usually around projects with 
specific time lines. During the two-year development of a new product, it may be 
crucial to keep the design team together, but less important to keep them together 
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dentials for commitment. On the one hand, this may suggest that 
the enforcement of noncompetes to protect employers' "people" 
interest violates the new social contract: If employers promise 
workers employability in exchange for loyalty to their work, the 
employees have in effect "purchased" their experience and 
should not be prevented from using the skills they acquire else-
where.163 On the other hand, noncompetes may be seen as a way 
of holding the employee to the terms of the tacit agreement 
where the employee would otherwise be inclined to breach. If, 
for instance, the understanding is that the employer will provide 
training necessary for an employee to contribute to a particular 
project in exchange for the employee's commitment to its com-
pletion, it might be appropriate to allow the employer to enforce 
a noncompete to prevent the employee from departing mid-
project, though inappropriate to restrain the employee once the 
project has concluded. 164 While the old loyalty-for-job security 
compact was self-enforcing, the new one is jeopardized by the 
lure of external opportunities and the pace of change in a market 
where skills and experience are in high demand. 165 That diffi-
culty is compounded by the message that employees should 
gauge their own development by external standards and that ulti-
for the next version, which may bear no relationship to the prior one. See CAPPELLI, 
supra note 117, at 176. 
163 Professor Katherine Stone convincingly asserts this argument in her recent 
scholarship. See Stone , supra note 3, at 590-91. Under such an analysis , the em-
ployee purchases experience through the work he or she provides rather than 
through reduced wages. Such a perspective dispels the economic justification for 
enforcement based on employer investment in training and development. See id. at 
591 ("When an employer has promised to give an employee skill development and 
general knowledge as part of the employment deal , then it cannot be said that the 
employer has paid for its acquisition. "). 
164 Many case outcomes are consistent with this observation, inclining toward en-
forcement of noncompetes where the timing of the employee's departure creates 
special hardships for the employer. See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int'I, Inc. v. 
Software Artisans, Inc ., 3 F.3d 730, 737-41 (4th Cir. 1993) (enforcing noncompete 
against employees who departed during production of computer program to create 
competitor program for subsequent employer); cf Hyde , supra note 3 (discussing 
"moralistic" quality of court analysis of trade secret claims in California). 
165 See Kraus , supra note 80, at 49 (suggesting that modern employers have been 
forced to implement training repayment contracts since they cannot rely on em-
ployee loyalty and job satisfaction to protect their investments) ; cf CAPPELLI, supra 
note 117, at 15 (noting need for strong labor law to create incentives not to "cheat " 
in transactional relationships). Research on the relationship between formal con-
tracts and informal social contracts suggests that parties will rely on informal under-
standings where the terms of such agreements are self-enforcing, but will opt for 
formalized contracts where there is a danger of opportunistic behavior. See Rock & 
Wachter, supra note 130, 1944. 
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mately the employee is likely to pursue his or her career else-
where. In this environment, employers may look to 
noncompetes to enforce the new social contract and a new un-
derstanding of loyalty and commitment. 
C. Revisiting Worker Protection: The Absence of Bargained-
for Commitment and the Limitations of 
Preenforcement Review 
The previous section explained why employers might, in con-
travention of the existing rule, attempt to use noncompetes for 
the express purpose of retaining their workers. 166 Such an analy-
sis rejects the existing proxy for assessing fairness: If employers 
are in some manner purchasing or contracting for the right to 
keep an individual employed, the absence of a trade secret or 
other discrete information does not indicate the employer is 
overreaching. However, this analysis does not suggest that all 
uses of noncompetes to prevent employee attrition should be 
deemed legally permissible or that these agreements should be 
enforced according to their terms. Indeed, there is often reason 
to doubt the legitimacy of the written document and its particular 
terms as a reflection of a bargained-for exchange. 167 This uncer-
tainty stems from the indeterminate nature of the parties' rela-
166 It would be interesting to attempt empirical research to determine to what 
extent employers are using noncompetes for these purposes as opposed to tradi-
tional reasons, like trade secret protection. I know of no study that has attempted 
this. In fact, it may prove exceedingly difficult to execute such research due to its 
inevitable reliance on some form of self-reporting. My own anecdotal queries to 
human resources professionals as to why their companies use noncompetes have 
tended to elicit responses that echo the doctrinal rule. That is, employees are apt to 
say they use noncompetes to protect trade secrets and "confidential information" 
but are generally unable to elaborate meaningfully as to what exactly requires pro-
tection. It may be that these individuals, based on their professional experience and 
their interactions with attorneys, have learned the legal touchstone for enforceability 
and invoke it by rote. Or it may be that given the confusion surrounding the law, 
human resources understand this phraseology as embracing their interests in intel-
lectual capital and employee loyalty. Either way, it suggests that a scientific effort to 
document the reasons for the use of noncompetes would be a challenging task. 
167 It should be noted that even within the economics-influenced literature rela-
tively few commentators advocate a pure free market analysis of noncompete en-
forcement, recognizing that despite the viability of the employer investment model, 
various factors may lead the parties to create suboptimal contracts. See Gallo, supra 
note 3, at 723-24 (describing the "moderate" economic view of noncompete con-
tracts under which judicial intervention may be justified where enforcement will 
yield inefficient results); see generally supra note 144. But see Callahan, supra note 
28, at 725-27 (advocating for enforcement of noncompetes subject only to standard 
contract defenses). 
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tionship as of the time of formation and the likelihood that they 
will modify their implicit understanding as the relationship 
evolves. On the other hand, it is unlikely that judicial assessment 
of the fairness of the agreement at the time of enforcement pro-
vides a workable means of balancing the parties' interests, and it 
may compound the problem by diminishing the binding effect of 
written agreements and reducing the parties' incentive to con-
tract responsibly. The following section explores those concerns. 
1. Noncompetes from a Relational Contracts Perspective 
Despite the viability of employers' interest in their workers 
from a business perspective, the explanation that employers are 
purchasing a right to their employees may ultimately be found 
deficient when measured against the practical consequences of 
enforcement in some instances. Case law not infrequently 
reveals employer efforts to enforce agreements worded broadly 
enough to jeopardize the employee's ability to engage in his or 
her profession. 168 A fundamental principle involving the sale of 
labor has always been a disdain for contracts that approximate a 
form of indentured servitude. 169 Restraint of competitive em-
ployment is not itself objectionable, and is sanctioned as an alter-
native to specific performance in situations where the breach of a 
contract for personal services cannot be remedied through 
money damages. 170 The problem, however, is that the duration 
and scope of the restraint in many noncompete agreements ap-
pear disproportionate to the breach in the context in which it 
occurs. 
168 See, e.g., Nature House, Inc. v. Sloan, 515 F. Supp. 398, 399-400 (N.D. Ill. 
1981) (noncompete prohibiting indefinitely employee artist from rendering any fu-
ture drawings of birds for any entities); Gynecologic Oncology, P.C. v. Weiser, 443 
S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (a physician non-compete containing two-year 
restraint plus tolling provision permitting duration to be extended indefinitely dur-
ing any period of violation); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) 
(noncompete placing lifelong restriction on defendant dentist's ability to practice 
oral surgery within a five county radius); Frederick v. Profl Bldg. Maint. Indus., 344 
N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (noncompete placing ten-year restriction on 
management trainee's competition in the contract cleaning business). In such situa-
tions the terms of the agreement, if applied as written, would not only constrain an 
employee's choice of work but seriously preclude his or her ability to earn a living. 
l69 See Sterk, supra note 31, at 387-88 (discussing Thirteenth Amendment ratio-
nale for preventing employer from obtaining specific performance of a personal ser-
vice contract); see also discussion supra Part I.A. 
170 The seminal case is Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch. 1852) (re-
straining defendant opera singer from singing at any concerts other than plaintiff's 
where defendant breached an exclusive three-month performance contract). 
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In framing the noncompete problem from the perspective of 
employee protection then, the question becomes why the terms 
of written agreements often prove onerous to employees if we 
deem individual workers competent to enter into agreements to 
sell their labor and human capital. The historical response, previ-
ously discussed, is that employees lack bargaining power to nego-
tiate fair terms of employment and that the agreement reached 
will therefore unduly favor the employer. 171 Law and economics 
scholars, as well as others who champion an expansive view of 
employer interests, have long disdained this rationale for judicial 
intervention. 172 From such perspectives, concerns about em-
ployee bargaining power appear overly simplistic against the cur-
rent economic backdrop in which human capital is recognized as 
a valuable asset. 173 If the employer wishes to retain a particular 
worker, then by definition the employee must possess valuable 
skills and knowledge that give the employee some degree of lev-
erage.174 Such an argument does not maintain that employees 
have equivalent bargaining power as a rule, but rather that the 
relative bargaining strength of the parties will depend on the la-
bor market and demand for the employee's skills, such that gen-
eralizations about employees as a class are of limited utility in 
justifying a pervasive policy of judicial intervention. 175 
171 See supra Part I.A. 
172 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 31, at 409 (arguing that "inequality of bargaining 
power ... can provide, at best, only a partial explanation for legislative and judicial 
reluctance to enforce restrictive covenants"); Callahan, supra note 28, at 721 (noting 
that "[m]ost contracts are negotiated by parties with unequal bargaining power, and 
unequal shrewdness, yet courts do not invalidate or rewrite ordinary contracts on 
these grounds"). 
173 Courts' ability to issue such injunctions may be considered a logical corollary 
to individuals' rights to alienate their services, which, if limited, may result in unde-
sirable limitations on individuals' ability to enter into contracts of their choosing. 
See Sterk, supra note 31, at 411 ("By protecting an employee's freedom to leave his 
employer without serious consequences, courts impose a corresponding restriction 
on an employee's freedom to contract about future use of his 'own' human 
capital."). 
174 Arguably those employees asked to sign noncompetes are likely to be upper-
level employees who have greater ability to negotiate with their employers. See 
Callahan, supra note 28, at 721-22 (reasoning that most sensitive information is in 
the possession of more highly skilled, sophisticated employees who have alternative 
employment opportunities). But see Stone, supra note 3, at 586 (noting increased 
prevalence of noncompetes within lower-level and lower-skilled professions such as 
beauticians and delivery persons). 
175 See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 34-35 (discussing effect of shifts in skilled 
labor supply on employee bargaining power and, by consequence, the implicit agree-
ments reached between employers and employees). The dearth of high-tech em-
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Even if a particular employee possesses valuable human capi-
tal that is in demand in the relevant market, however, there are 
reasons to distrust the quality of the bargain he or she reaches 
with the employer. Some of these reasons are procedural: Many 
noncompetes are presented to employees on the day they start 
their jobs or shortly thereafter, at which point the employee is 
effectively unable to assert the leverage he or she otherwise 
could by declining the job. 176 More importantly, even an em-
ployee who is given the opportunity to review a noncompete 
before accepting a position is likely to have little incentive to ne-
gotiate its terms. In general, employees have limited information 
on which to base a decision about the fairness of a noncompete 
or evaluate the risk of accepting its terms. 177 The employee can-
not predict such things as the extent and value of training that 
the employer will provide, the progression of his or her wages, 
the personal satisfaction he or she will experience on the job, the 
duration of the parties' relationship, or the future direction of the 
company and the market, all of which will reveal the wisdom of 
signing the agreement. 178 Although the employer likewise has 
limited information from which to determine whether and what 
type of noncompete it should demand from its employees, it is 
certainly in a better position to make that prediction given that it 
controls the structures through which the employment relation-
ployees relative to the needs of employers in the late 1990s, many of whom were 
small start-up companies, presents an obvious example. See Margaret Coles, IT 
Stars Use Courts to Cast Off Chains, SuNDA Y TIMES (London), Dec. 5, 1999, at 20 
(noting that the "hot young talent in the information-technology world are 'more 
akin to rock stars than to regular employees'" in suggesting that such employees 
possess bargaining power and exercise it to refuse noncompetes); cf Callahan, supra 
note 28, at 723 (arguing that the "solicitous treatment of employees assumes that 
they are both fungible and overabundant" in criticizing courts' willingness to investi-
gate the substance of noncompete agreement based on bargaining power concerns). 
176 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
171 See Sterk, supra note 31, at 408-09 (suggesting that deficiencies in information 
or lack of insight could lead employees to sign noncompetes that are against their 
interest); Rena Mara Samole, Note, Real Employees: Cognitive Psychology and the 
Adjudication of Non-Competition Agreements, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 289, 307-08 
(2000) (discussing bounds on employee knowledge or access to information relevant 
to assessing whether to sign noncompete). 
178 To the extent the employee does consider such issues, he or she may discount 
the likelihood of the relationship terminating or of future competitive opportunities. 
See Sterk, supra note 31, at 409; Samole, supra note 177, at 308-11 (examining cog-
nitive capability of employees and suggesting that employees confronted with 
noncompetes underestimate risks of agreement and are overly optimistic regarding 
their own success). 
Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age 1215 
ship will develop. 179 Even so, the number of contingencies for 
which the employer can expressly provide by contract is finite. 180 
For all of these reasons, it may be inappropriate to view 
noncompete terms as the product of reasoned reflection or as 
dispositive of the parties' rights and obligations. The unreliabil-
ity of the document as a formal contract is not a problem specific 
to noncompete agreements, but one that is ubiquitous in long-
term contracts contemplating a significant degree of personal in-
volvement from the parties. Scholars in relational contract the-
ory have long suggested that parties in ongoing commercial 
relationships intend their contracts to be informally rewritten 
over time and expect that their behavior will be governed by re-
lational norms. 181 If that is the case, judicial enforcement of the 
precise terms of their written agreements, without considering 
the context in which enforcement is sought, may actually violate 
the parties' contractual intent. This conclusion regarding long-
term commercial contracts may be all the more convincing in the 
employment context where the aim of the relationship is not the 
sale of a tangible good, but rather the development and exploita-
tion of the relationship itself. 182 The nature of employment, or 
179 Even where the employer's needs and the relevant labor market suggest that 
the employee has significant bargaining power, it is the employer who ultimately 
controls the trajectory of the relationship since it controls its infrastructure, includ-
ing such things as the delivery of training, structure of compensation systems, pro-
motion hierarchy, and so forth. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 3. Additionally, 
the employer is much more likely to have access to counsel and to take the opportu-
nity to make more reasoned decisions about the noncompete terms it wishes to of-
fer. See Sterk, supra note 31, at 409. 
180 It is impossible for employers and employees to specify in advance their pre-
cise expectations regarding their relationship, just as it would be impossible to write 
down every job duty in a description of a particular position. See CAPPELLI, supra 
note 117, at 18 (describing the "virtual impossibility of managing employees through 
explicit contracts); cf Lester, supra note 3, at 65 n.75 (discussing the difficulty of 
drafting to reflect all future contingencies and noting that lack of complete informa-
tion may result in written contracts that contain vague, inaccurate or open terms). 
181 Relational contract theory proceeds from the proposition that "contract is fun-
damentally about cooperative social behavior." Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract 
Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 743 (2000). It derives principally from 
the scholarship of Ian Macneil. See, e.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SocJAL CON-
TRACT (1980): Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 11; Ian Macneil, Economic 
Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classifica-
tory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018 (1981) [hereinafter Macneil, Economic 
Analysis). For additional commentary discussing relational values in contracting, 
see Gude!, supra note 11, and Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of 
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). 
182 See Gude!, supra note 11, at 787-91; cf Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureau-
cratic Power, and the Contract of Employment, 15 !Nous. L.J. I, 3 (1986) (noting 
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any contract for ongoing personal services, is that the arrange-
ment evolves over time to reflect changes in the needs and expec-
tations of the parties. The employer and employee have limited 
ability to formally describe all of the rights and obligations they 
expect to attach to their relationship as of the point of its initia-
tion, let alone provide for the myriad of contingencies that will 
influence and affect their joint endeavor over time. 183 Reliance 
on oral or informal agreements enables the parties to continually 
readjust their obligations to one another in response to the dy-
namic factors that affect the workplace. 184 
In the context of noncompetes, enforcement of a written 
agreement may or may not accord with the parties' actual expec-
tations. Enforcement of a noncompete to protect an investment 
in training, for instance, would be consistent with the parties' im-
plicit understanding where the employer contributes to the em-
ployee's professional development and the employee voluntarily 
terminates employment before the investment has been "paid 
back." But judicial enforcement of the precise terms of the 
noncompete could subject the employee to restraints long after 
he or she had purchased the training and experience provided 
during the relationship. 185 Similarly, enforcement of a noncom-
that the characterization of the employment relationship as a contract "fails to grasp 
the nature of the social relationships involved"). 
183 See Samuel lssacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of 
the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1799 (1996) (describing sources of uncer-
tainty that compromise parties' ability to express terms of employment at point of 
hire); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause in Employ-
ment at Will, 92 M1cH. L. REv. 8, 19-20 (1993) (describing parties' inability to nego-
tiate detailed employment contract as a result of difficulties anticipating future 
contingencies and difficulties monitoring and verifying performance of express 
obligations). 
184 Related to this concept is the idea of the "incomplete" contract in law and 
economics literature. From the law and economics perspective, parties intentionally 
leave out certain terms from their written contracts in order either to maintain flexi-
bility in the face of future events or to avoid transaction costs associated with negoti-
ating and drafting particular terms. Informational asymmetry may be one reason 
why parties choose incomplete or implicit agreements over comprehensive con-
tracts. See Schwartz, supra note 148, at 280 n.16 (1992); cf Goetz & Scott, supra 
note 181, at 1091 (characterizing relational contracts as those in which parties are 
incapable of reducing certain terms to writing either because of the inability to iden-
tify future conditions or because incorporation of known contingencies is too 
complex). 
185 See generally Lester, supra note 3, at 69 (discussing potential for opportunistic 
behavior by employer in situations where employee departs after the employer has 
recouped its financial investment in training). It is the timing of the employee's 
departure that determines whether the attempt at enforcement accords with the par-
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pete would be consistent with the parties' implicit understanding 
if used to enforce spot commitments to the organization. How-
ever, it would be inappropriate where the employee departed af-
ter completing a project or was involuntarily terminated for 
cause or as a consequence of unforeseen market fluctuations. 186 
Thus, noncompete enforcement is problematic because it of-
fers employers the best of two worlds: relational and contractual. 
Because they are formal contracts, noncompetes give the em-
ployer a guaranteed means of enforcing what would otherwise be 
dependent on voluntary compliance, namely a legal remedy for 
redressing employee defections where the employer sees fit to 
ties' implicit understanding or constitutes a form of employer abuse. See id. ("[T]he 
relevant question is not simply whether the employer made a costly investment in 
training ... [but] whether one party has appropriated some of the value of the 
training without paying for it."). 
186 Whether employers may invoke noncompete protection against involuntarily 
terminated employees has been debated extensively in the case law. Several courts 
have held that the act of firing a worker extinguishes the employer's right to obtain 
an injunction against competition. See, e.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 
1983) (concluding that implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
precludes employer enforcement of noncompete following unjustified termination 
of employee); Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 737 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995) (concluding that method of termination is relevant factor to consider in 
assessing reasonableness of noncompete in refusing to enforce agreement against 
employee discharged for poor performance); see also Gallo, supra note 3, at 734-41 
(analyzing courts' varying treatment of noncompete claims against involuntarily ter-
minated workers). While this Article is chiefly concerned with employer efforts to 
avoid employee defection, it bears noting that the judicial trend toward disallowing 
enforcement in the involuntary termination context is consistent with the parties' 
understanding of their implicit agreement and the limits of the employer's interest in 
its workers. The act of terminating the employee belies the existence of any contin-
ued interest in the employee's skills, commitment, or services that could justify a 
restraint, regardless of the employer's expectations at the outset of the relationship. 
See Insulation Corp. of Am., 667 A.2d at 735 ("The employer who fires an employee 
for failing to perform in a manner that promotes the employer's business interests 
deems the employee worthless .... [W]e conclude that it is unreasonable as a matter 
of law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over that which it has 
effectively discarded."). Indeed, in situations in which the employee is terminated 
the implicit agreement of the new workplace specifically contemplates that the em-
ployee will be able to resell his human capital to competitors. See Stone, supra note 
3, at 569-71; supra Part III.A. On the other hand, it may be necessary to distinguish 
between those employees terminated for cause and those terminated without cause, 
the rationale against noncompete enforcement applying only to the latter. Argua-
bly, an employee who is terminated for breach of a term of an employment contract 
or for violating the duty of loyalty, for instance by disclosing a trade secret, should 
not be permitted to avoid application of an otherwise valid noncompete by engaging 
in behavior that leads the employer to terminate him or her. See, e.g., Gismondi, 
Paglia, Sherling, M.D. v. Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf Cray 
v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178-79 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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exercise it On the other hand, since noncompetes do not con-
tractually define any other aspect of the employment relation-
ship, they create no legal obligation on the part of the employer 
to fulfill any of its own commitments under the parties' implicit 
understanding. From the perspective of the employee, this 
means the noncompete contract provides no assurance that em-
ployers will pursue enforcement fairly, or even that the employer 
will provide the training and experience it implicitly promised in 
exchange for its restraint on the employee's mobility. Thus, the 
value and the danger of unequivocal enforcement of noncompete 
agreements is that it allows an employer to legally effect compli-
ance with some aspects of the parties' understanding, while fore-
closing the interactive process of redefining the terms of the 
relationship that would otherwise protect the worker. 
2. Binding Agreements and the Viability of Preenforcement 
Substantive Review 
This disconnect between formalized agreements and implicit 
understandings in the employment context supports the existing 
sentiment that noncompete enforcement must be limited in some 
measure to protect workers. It is not at all clear, however, that 
substantive review of noncompetes in the context in which en-
forcement is sought is a desirable solution. Abandoning the pro-
tectable interest proxy in favor of a more open-ended evaluation 
may result in a less contrived assessment of the parties' interests, 
but it is likely to be at the expense of further increasing the un-
certainty in the case law and reducing parties' incentives to craft 
the terms of their agreements with care. 
At the outset, evaluation of noncompetes at the time of en-
forcement requires some consensus on the nature of the substan-
tive inquiry. An initial question is what rule or standard the 
court should adopt in lieu of its current examination of the em-
ployer's protectable interest and the "reasonableness" of the re-
straint as a basis for determining whether enforcement is fair. 
One option is for the court to identify and impose an efficient 
outcome under the circumstances. 187 The court could assess the 
value of the training and experience provided by the employer 
and the value of the employee's work against the timing of the 
187 See Schwartz, supra note 148, at 277-78 (discussing the law and economics 
approach to contractual incompleteness which favors adoption of efficient rules to 
supplement incomplete contracts). 
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departure, and enforce the noncompete if the court determines 
that the employer was not sufficiently compensated for its out-
lay.188 Alternatively, the court could enforce a result that ac-
cords with the parties' implicit understanding or with relevant 
external norms. 189 The court could require, for instance, that the 
parties establish the extracontractual terms of their relationship 
and enforce the noncompete only upon demonstration that the 
employee had violated an aspect of the shared understanding. 190 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of which approach 
achieves the more desirable outcome, 191 it is unlikely that either 
188 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF 
TRADE: A LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 147-48 (1986) (advocating a case-by-
case approach to noncompete enforcement that inquires whether the employer has 
lost out on an investment in human capital); see also Lester, supra note 3, at 69-70 
( explaining this approach). 
189 While relational contract theory often refers generally to the role of relational 
norms in judicial adjudication, at least some scholarship distinguishes between an 
approach that focuses primarily on the unique expectations that arise during the 
course of the parties' relationship and that which focuses on a transcendent concept 
of substantive fairness derived from relevant societal norms. See Schwartz, supra 
note 148, at 275-76 (distinguishing between "internal" and "external" relational ap-
proach to contractual incompleteness). 
190 See, e.g., Macneil, Economic Analysis, supra note 181; Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. 
L. REv. 927 (1990); see also Schwartz, supra note 148, at 275-76. The outcome 
under this approach would differ from that which would be reached under the effi-
ciency-based approach in two scenarios. One would be where the employer had not 
recouped the cost of its outlay but the employee did not share the understanding 
that he would be required to stay. The other would be where the parties' under-
standing was that the employee would stay beyond the required time to recoup the 
employer's investment because the employer had an interest in maintaining commit-
ment for non-pecuniary reasons. 
191 Although this debate concerns much of the literature on relational and incom-
plete contracts, see Schwartz, supra note 148, at 274-78 (suggesting that relational 
contract theory and economic analysis of "incomplete" contracts offer alternative 
means of addressing the shared problem of contract interpretation under circum-
stances that appear not to have been contemplated by the parties), it is not clear that 
the choice of approach will effect differing results in most cases. It has been argued 
for instance, that the parties to commercial relationships generally expect and intend 
that each will seek to maximize self-interest, which supports the conclusion that reli-
ance on internal norms of the relationship will yield the result otherwise achieved by 
selecting terms that maximize efficiency. See id. at 276-77. Similarly, some scholars 
have predicted that principles of fairness, what might be considered the source of 
external norms, will increasingly reflect concerns of efficiency and maximization of 
joint gain under the theory that what is efficient is objectively fair. See Schwab, 
supra note 126, at 34. On the other hand, there appear to be some instances where 
the means selected will alter the ends achieved. Employees may know their em-
ployer intends to invest in worker training in order to maximize profits but not know 
or share in the understanding that a definitive commitment to remaining on the job 
is required for the employer to realize the benefit of its investment. Similarly, a 
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lays the foundation for a workable rule. The efficiency-based ap-
proach would require the court to engage in economically sophis-
ticated valuations of the worker's marginal product relative to 
the investment of the employer. Executing such calculations in 
specific cases that may well prove infeasible. 192 Neither is it ap-
parent how a court would define appropriate external norms or 
undertake an inquiry into the substance of an implicit agreement. 
The success of such an approach would be dependent on the par-
ties' ability to prove the content of oral statements and substanti-
ate their subjective understandings. Thus, in either of these 
cases, the specificity or subjectivity of the requisite inquiry would 
make it virtually impossible for parties to predict whether a par-
ticular agreement would be found enforceable at any given point 
in the parties' relationship. 
Indeed, any of these forms of judicial review may have the per-
verse effect of diluting the significance that the parties might oth-
erwise attach to their written terms. Particularly where a 
jurisdiction will revise an agreement deemed unfair, employers 
have an incentive to request more protection than what would 
appear reasonable. 193 In effect, by looking to the circumstances 
in which enforcement is sought, the law perpetuates a cycle in 
which parties fail to meaningfully consider the consequences of 
the terms they select or engage in serious negotiation, which in 
turn makes judicial intervention necessary. 
Because of the difficulties of finding a workable standard for 
shared norm may develop that requires the employee to remain on the job for per-
sonal or other non-pecuniary reasons beyond the time necessary for the employer to 
recoup its monetary outlay. 
192 See Lester, supra note 3, at 70 (calling such an approach the "optimal rule in a 
first-best world" but questioning courts' ability to carry it out). The problem of judi-
cial competency to determine efficient ex ante results has been a central concern of 
the law and economics literature on gap-filling in incomplete contracts. See, e.g., 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Con-
tracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1994) (suggesting that generalist courts have 
limited ability to determine efficient outcomes); cf Schwartz, supra note 148, at 279-
80 (suggesting that parties contract with knowledge that certain information will be 
observable to them but incapable of verification before a court). But see Eric Pos-
ner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 749, 762-69 (2000) (arguing that creating legally enforceable contracts 
deters highly opportunistic behavior even though courts lack competency to enforce 
them properly). 
193 See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 82, at 547 (suggesting that judicial rewriting 
strategies "encourage employers to be 'unreasonable' because there is, in effect, no 
sanction for being unreasonable"); see generally supra Part LB (describing "blue-
pencil" approach to over broad noncompete agreements). 
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review, some commentators have suggested abandoning the use 
of noncompete agreements to protect employers' interests in 
people in favor of adopting "pay back" agreements designed spe-
cifically to reimburse the employer for the cost of training. 194 
While prohibiting any type of contractual protection for training 
appears inconsistent with the recognition of the value of human 
capital to employers, an effort to limit that protection based on 
the form of the agreement does offer some advantages. "Pay 
back" agreements tend to be drafted more narrowly than 
noncompetes in that they require employee repayment of spe-
cific costs only in the event the employee departs within a desig-
nated time period. By limiting the duration of the employee's 
repayment obligation ex ante, such agreements in theory prevent 
the employer from redefining the terms of the understanding at 
the time of enforcement. Enforcement of such agreements 
should therefore be less onerous, or at least less surprising, to 
employees. 
However, repayment agreements ultimately raise many of the 
same practical problems associated with noncompetes. Since it is 
the uncommon situation in which the parties discuss or attempt 
to anticipate the extent of the employer's investment or the 
length of the employee's commitment, the terms of the agree-
ment are unlikely to be any more "fair" than those of a noncom-
pete. The goal of requiring specifically drafted contracts may be 
to preclude any contractual agreement where such information is 
unknown, but it is equally likely that the employer will request 
such an agreement regardless, utilizing speculative terms to pre-
serve the possibility of enforcement in the face of uncertainty. If 
at the time of the employee's departure the required payments 
prove more costly than the value of the employee's un-
reimbursed human capital, enforcement of the pay back provi-
sion is no less burdensome to the employee than the noncompete 
agreement. 195 Indeed, if the payments required are substantial, 
194See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 80; Lester, supra note 3, at 75-76; cf Rubin & 
Shedd, supra note 82, at 100-07 (advocating continuation of existing rule limiting 
noncompete enforceability and against extending protection to other forms of train-
ing in order to avoid opportunities for overreaching). At least one state has adopted 
such an approach through legislation. In Colorado, employers are statutorily au-
thorized to require employees who depart within two years of hire to repay the cost 
of their training. See Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (2001). 
195 One can argue that a repayment agreement is less onerous than a noncompete 
because the subsequent employer can easily assume the employee's contractual obli-
gation. Yet noncompete agreements are themselves only slightly less amenable to 
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the agreement may prove more constraining because it forces the 
employee to produce cash and provides no option to comply with 
the agreement by refraining from competitive employment. 196 
Thus, unless there is reason to trust the process by which the 
terms of such agreements are chosen, they are potentially as 
problematic as noncompetes and arguably should be subjected to 
the same form of judicial review at the time enforcement is 
sought. 197 
IV 
TOWARD A FORMATION-BASED MODEL OF 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
It remains to be considered whether a viable doctrinal ap-
proach can be found to assess the appropriateness of enforce-
ment in individual cases. Such an approach should recognize the 
parties' ability to purchase and sell human capital as a compo-
nent of their employment contract, but limit to some degree em-
ployers' ability to impose and enforce terms that go beyond 
protection of their legitimate needs or violate agreed upon 
norms. Ideally, that approach should also enhance consistency 
and predictability in the case law. 
While an administerable rule that achieves all of these ends 
may ultimately prove elusive, the following section offers some 
preliminary doctrinal suggestions. In so doing, it returns to basic 
contract principles and defenses as a means of determining 
whether enforcement of the express terms of an agreement is jus-
tifiable despite its potentially harsh effects. To that end, the Arti-
cle examines a formation-based model of enforcement proposed 
such a resolution. It is in fact commonplace among a certain class of employees for 
the poaching company to pay the employee's way out of an existing restraint. The 
situation with which the law must be concerned, of course , is that of the employee 
who has no such opportunity or is chilled in his or her efforts to find future work 
because of the existence of the agreement. 
196 While relatively few judicial opinions involving repayment agreements have 
been handed down, the highly disfavorable treatment they have received suggests 
that courts share such concerns . See , e.g., Brunner v. Hand Indus. , 603 N.E.2d 157, 
159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to enforce repayment agreement under which 
defecting employee was required to reimburse employer $20,000 for training in 
treating orthopedic products). 
197 An alternative may be to establish legislative limitations on such agreements. 
See Lester, supra note 3, at 76 (proposing the possibility of a cap on training costs 
and other statutory limitations). It is unclear, however, whether a single legislative 
scheme could account for the wide range of variables that will determine the appro-
priateness of such agreements in different situations across different industries. 
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by uniform domestic relations law to deal with the analogous 
problem of premarital agreements. Such a model rigorously ex-
amines contractual assent and the context in which it occurs to 
ensure that the parties' adoption of a written agreement repre-
sents a reasoned choice to reject flexibility in favor of legally fix-
ing their obligations. The Article concludes by considering how a 
formation-based model of enforcement applied to noncompete 
agreements might achieve a more consistent approach to en-
forcement, one that strikes a balance between a pure freedom-of-
contract ideals and an approach that seeks to enforce the implicit 
terms of the parties' relationship to achieve a substantively fair 
result. 
A. Existing Limits on Contractual Enforceability 
One way of crafting an alternative approach to noncompetes 
that avoids a contextualized substantive analysis at the time of 
enforcement is to return to fundamental contract principles in 
assessing how such agreements are formed. While contract law 
obviously does not contemplate review of the effects of enforce-
ment, it does establish basic prerequisites and defenses to en-
forcement that in theory assure that parties willingly accepted the 
risks inherent in their agreement. In this respect, the concepts of 
assent and consideration are threshold requirements whose pres-
ence indicates that both parties agreed to their written terms pur-
suant to a true exchange. 
The available defenses of duress and unconscionability focus 
on these basic ideas of consent and exchange in contract forma-
tion. The duress defense allows a party to escape contractual lia-
bility where that party's acceptance of the agreement occurred 
under circumstances that impaired the meaningfulness of his or 
her consent-for instance, where the party is threatened or co-
erced.198 In the same way, the unconscionability doctrine looks 
at the terms of the agreement and the process through which 
they were reached to limit enforceability where the contract was 
unlikely to have been the product of knowing agreement. The 
198 See, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 2000) ( defining du-
ress as a condition where one party is induced to contract by means of a wrongful act 
or threat); King v. Donnkenny Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. Va. 2000) (defin-
ing duress as the application of "undue pressure in a contractual bargaining pro-
cess."); Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. App. 2000) (observing that 
duress requires proof of a threat to do something which the threatening party has no 
right to do). 
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doctrine takes into account procedural concerns such as the 
knowledgeableness and bargaining skill of the parties, 199 as well 
as the use of fine print and complex language to obscure unfavor-
able terms. 200 It also looks to the substantive terms of exchange 
to see if they were unduly favorable to one side as of the time of 
formation. 201 Thus, some scholars have suggested that existing 
contract principles sufficiently address concerns about the fair-
ness of noncompete agreements and that any inquiry into en-
forceability should be limited to an analysis of these defenses. 202 
The problem with reliance on these contract principles and de-
fenses as the sole bases for reviewing noncompetes is that courts 
tend to employ these doctrines with hesitation and only in very 
limited circumstances. The duress defense requires an actual or 
implied threat of loss or harm that leaves the "victim" of duress 
with "no reasonable alternative" but to accept the demands of 
the party with the superior bargaining position. 203 Such threats, 
199 See, e.g., Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budd Morgan Cent. Station Alarm 
Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that factors considered in as-
sessing unconscionability include the experience and education of the aggrieved 
party as well as any disparity in the bargaining power); In re Turner Bros. Trucking 
Co., 8 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding agreement unconscionable where 
aggrieved party had difficulty understanding its terms); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 403 (Utah 1998) (noting that factors bearing on unconscionability 
include whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the contract 
terms and whether the contract terms were explained to the weaker party). 
200 See, e.g., Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 121; Monscatiello v. 
Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1190, 1196-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(finding fine print warranty disclaimer unconscionable). 
201 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-91 
(Cal. 2000) (holding preemployment application forms containing mandatory arbi-
tration clauses unconscionable because terms were so favorable to employer); 
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 121 ( observing that substantive un-
conscionability requires determining if the contract terms were unreasonably 
favorable to the party against whom unconscionability is urged); Ryan, 972 P.2d at 
402 (same). 
202 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 28, at 725-27 ( concluding that unconscionability 
defense provides an appropriately limited mechanism for protecting genuinely dis-
advantaged employees); Sterk, supra note 31, at 405-12 (finding traditional concerns 
about bargaining power and anticompetitive behavior insufficient to justify treating 
exchanges of human capital pursuant to noncompete agreements different from 
other contractually alienable property interests). But see Closius & Schaffer, supra 
note 82, at 548-49 (suggesting that contract rules should be subordinated to agency 
rules in evaluating noncompetes and arguing that enforcement should be permitted 
only where the employee's fiduciary obligations provide a basis for the restraint). 
203 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175(1) (1981) (stating that du-
ress exists where contractual assent is induced by "an improper threat by the other 
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative"); accord Contempo Design, 
Inc. v. Chicago & Northeast Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 226 F.3d 535, 551 (7th 
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however loosely defined, would rarely, if ever, accompany an 
employer's request for a noncompete in the ordinary employ-
ment case. Similarly, unconscionability is applied only to those 
situations in which both the unfairness of the terms and the cir-
cumstances under which they were reached combine to shock the 
conscience of the court. While such a standard would capture 
the "lifetime" covenant and other palpably excessive restraints, it 
would not touch the vast majority of noncompete provisions. 
It seems unlikely, therefore, that an approach constrained by 
existing contract law applicable to a wide range of agreements 
will offer a viable solution to the problem of noncompete en-
forcement. While such an approach offers consistency and as-
sures that the most egregious agreements are stricken, it does not 
account for the questions posed by the long-term and open-en-
ded nature of the employment relationship and its impact on the 
concepts of consent and exchange. In the absence of circum-
stances that rise to the level of duress or unconscionability, basic 
contract law deems the signature of the employee evidence of 
assent and the offer of employment sufficient consideration for 
the employee's concession, irrespective of the limitations on en-
forcement that the parties may have implicitly assumed. 
It does seems reasonable, however, to consider the possibility 
of enhancing the existing contractual inquiry to allow for a more 
careful review of contractual intent and issues peculiar to the for-
mation of noncompete agreements. Appropriately, the point of 
the duress and unconscionability defenses is to avoid enforce-
ment of agreements where both the terms and the process of 
reaching the agreement betray an absence of meaningful choice 
on one side. Having accepted the need for some judicial inter-
vention in enforcement, an analysis of contract formation issues 
that is somewhat more rigorous than that which exists under cur-
rent law may be less offensive to freedom of contract principles 
than a review that hinges on the substantive effects of enforce-
ment. Since the historical debate about noncompete enforce-
ment stems from concerns about bargaining power, analysis of 
Cir. 2000); see also Rissman, 213 F.3d at 386 ( defining duress as a condition where 
one is induced to contract under circumstances depriving him of his free will); Fred 
Ehrlich, P.C. v. Tullo, 710 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (same); Milgrim 
v. Backroads, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that where 
aggrieved party has alternative choice for redress, any claim of duress must fail); 
Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. for the Fifth Judicial Dist., 954 P.2d 608,613 (Colo. 
1998) (same). 
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the process by which these agreements are reached and the con-
text in which they are formed in fact seems particularly apposite. 
The following section looks at the law of premarital agreements 
as an area in which courts rigorously consider issues of consent 
and unconscionability in contract formation in order to strike a 
balance in enforcing agreements that raise similar substantive 
fairness concerns. 
B. The Premarital Agreement Analogy 
The premarital agreement, like a noncompete, is an effort to 
determine at the outset of a legal relationship the consequences 
of its termination. Coincident with the emergence of the new 
social contract of employment, the marital institution itself un-
derwent significant changes in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. As a result of the creation of no fault divorce laws in 
the 1970s, divorce became increasingly accessible and conse-
quently more prevalent among all segments of the population. 204 
The rising rates of divorce and remarriage in modern society 
have led many couples to consider more carefully their economic 
futures in advance of marriage and attempt to plan for the con-
tingency of marital dissolution through contract. 205 As in the em-
204 See June C. Carbone, Economics , Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: 
A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1463 , 1493 (1990) (suggesting that no-fault 
divorce eliminated both the stigma and financial disincentives associated with di-
vorce, leading to increase in divorce rates); Raymond C. O 'Brien, The Reawakening 
of Marriage, 102 W . VA. L. REv. 339,355 (1999) (estimating that no-fault divorce 
accounted for about one-fifth of the total increase in divorce rates between 1968 and 
1988, and noting that between 1960 and 1990, the divorce rate in the United States 
doubled). Indeed , the unprecedented surge in divorce rates has given rise to a mod-
ern reform movement that advocates the adoption of "covenant marriages" and 
other fault-based initiatives. See Lynn D . Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the 
Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 785-90 (1999) (noting 
public criticism of existing no-fault divorce laws and describing recent legislative 
reforms adopted in Louisiana and Arizona). For a brief summary of the history of 
American divorce law and the rise of the no-fault regime, see O'Brien , supra , at 352-
57. 
205 See Cory Adams , Part 3: Getting Married: Premarital Agreements , 11 J . CoN-
TEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 121, 122 (2000) (noting that sixty percent divorce rate forces 
couples to consider the likelihood of marital dissolution and suggesting that "serial 
spouse[s]" who have children from a prior marriage and/or substantial assets are 
likely to seek the protection of a prenuptial agreement); Leah Guggenheimer , A 
Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements , 17 WoMEN 's 
R-rs . L. REP. 147, 149 (1996) (suggesting that increase in second marriages and the 
increased tendency to marry later in life lead to greater reliance on premarital agree-
ments); Allison A . Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptual Agree-
ments , 49 STAN. L. REv. 887, 891 (1997) (suggesting various reasons for the 
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ployment context, would-be marital partners recognize that 
despite best intentions they are not guaranteed lifetime security 
in their relationships. 206 
From a legal and policy perspective, the history of premarital 
agreements is a tortured one that traces some of the same paths 
as the law of noncompete enforceability. Initially, premarital 
agreements that dictated the terms of marital dissolution were 
deemed void as a matter of public policy.207 The reasons were 
two-fold. Premarital agreements were perceived as denigrating 
marriage and even encouraging divorce. 208 More importantly, 
increased use of premarital agreements, including the prevalence of divorce and re-
marriage and the increase in individual assets brought by women to marriage as a 
consequence of their rising participation in the labor market and likelihood of mar-
rying later in life than in past decades). 
Z06 Cf CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 2-3 ("If the traditional, lifetime employment 
relationship was like a marriage, then the new employment relationship is like a 
lifetime of divorces and remarriages, a series of close relationships governed by the 
expectation going in that they need to be made to work, and yet will inevitably not 
last."). 
207 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 123 S.E.2d 115, 132 (Ga. 1961 ); In re Marriage 
of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586,587 (Iowa 1973); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 
293 (Tenn. 1964); Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Wis. 1950). By contrast, 
agreements governing property distribution upon death of a spouse were generally 
considered acceptable. See, e.g., In re Cantrell's Estate, 119 P.2d 483, 486 (Kan. 
1941); Gartner v. Gartner, 74 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. 1956); Buettner v. Buettner, 
505 P.2d 600, 603 (Nev. 1973); see also Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio 
1984) (describing historical distinction between the two forms of premarital agree-
ments and noting that agreements providing for property disposal upon a spouse's 
death were generally recognized as "conducive to marital tranquility" and upheld on 
the basis of "the spouses' interest in the preservation of their respective estates, and 
their reasonable desire to avoid disputes regarding such property after one spouse 
has died"). 
208 It was believed that the sacredness of entering a marital union was offended by 
discussions of its possible demise. See Marston, supra note 205, at 897 (summarizing 
rationales for judicial non-enforcement of premarital agreements prior to 1970); 
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millenium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647,649 (1999) (ex-
plaining that courts typically declined enforcement of premarital agreements for fear 
that such contracts were deleterious to the union or could cause parties to treat the 
marriage commitment lightly); see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lin-
gering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 136 
(1993). The perception that premarital agreements encouraged divorce was based 
on the fear that such agreements removed the husband's legal obligation of support 
upon divorce, thereby creating a financial incentive for husbands to leave their 
wives. See Crouch, 385 S.W.2d at 293 ("Such contract could induce a mercenary 
husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his 
pecuniary liability would be limited."); Cumming v. Cumming, 102 S.E. 572,575 (Va. 
1920) (noting that upholding these agreements "would be to invite disagreement, 
encourage separation, incite divorce proceedings, ... and destroy every principle of 
the law of marriage, requiring that husband and wife shall live together during their 
natural lives, and that the husband, within his financial ability, shall furnish the wife 
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courts questioned the quality of the bargaining process through 
which such agreements were reached, presuming that wives-to-be 
did not have the ability or presence of mind to provide contrac-
tual consent. 209 Courts feared that women, confronted with the 
superior bargaining power of their husbands, would unwittingly 
contract away their right to support, just as they feared workers 
might contract away their ability to earn a living. 
In the last thirty years, however, these sentiments have given 
way to tempered acceptance. Courts have rejected the conten-
tion that premarital agreements encourage divorce 210 and have 
taken a less gendered view of their effect on women. 211 At the 
with reasonable necessaries for her support"); Fricke, 42 N.W.2d at 502 ("In every 
civilized country [there is] the obligation, sacred as well as lawful, of a husband to 
protect and provide for his family, and to sustain the [premarital agreement] would 
be to invest him with a right to be both a faithless husband and a vicious citizen .") . 
209 See Stilley v. Folger , 14 Ohio 610, 648 (1846). 
Id. 
What person so exposed to imposition as a woman, contracting ,[sic] per-
sonally , with her intended husband , just on the eve of marriage , at a time 
when all prudential considerations are likely to be merged in a confiding 
attachment, or suppressed from an honorable instinct and sentiment of del-
icacy. Surely, it would be a reproach to the law, if the very virtues and 
graces of woman were thus allowed to become the successful means of 
overreaching and defrauding them in bargains. 
210 See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1050 (Alaska 1987) (finding idea 
that premarital agreements induce divorce "anachronistic " and concluding that "al-
lowing couples to think through the financial aspects of their marriage beforehand 
can only foster strength and permanency in that relationship "); Gross , 464 N.E.2d at 
506 ("[W]e conclude that the modern trends of marriage and divorce across the 
country dictate that reasonable laws must be forthcoming to accommodate these 
changing social attitudes . It may be reasonably concluded that [premarital] agree-
ments tend to promote or facilitate marriage, rather than encourage divorce."). Oc• 
casionally, however , courts will reject an agreement where it is perceived as 
bestowing an advantage on a party that chooses to divorce. See , e.g., In re Marriage 
of Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (voiding prenuptial agree-
ment giving wife $500,000 in the event of divorce because wife was thereby "en· 
couraged by the very terms of the agreement to seek a dissolution"). It has 
therefore been argued that the modern interpretation of this issue has the perverse 
effect of voiding those agreements that provide benefits beyond that which ordinary 
marital property rules would permit while permitting agreements that are less 
favorable to the waiving party , usually the wife. See Atwood , supra note 208, at 
136-37. 
211 Potter v. Collin , 321 So. 2d 128, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1975) ("In this day and 
age there is no longer any suggestion that women are unequal and in need of the 
protective arm of the court. "); Osborn v. Osborn , 226 N.E .2d 814, 819 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1966) (finding judicial emphasis on women 's lack of bargaining power out-
dated in light of women's increased status in contemporary society); Simeone v. 
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (noting that "women are no longer regarded 
as the 'weaker' party in marriage ... [n]or is there validity in the presumption that 
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same time, they continue to recognize the uniqueness of mar-
riage relative to other contractual relationships, how that impacts 
the parties' ability to bargain, and the difficulties inherent in con-
tracting in advance for future contingencies within a marriage. 212 
The question has been how to account for these problems in cre-
ating a standard for judicial intervention. Historically, the law 
has focused on a contextualized assessment of the substantive ef-
fects of the premarital agreement's terms, much like the current 
law of noncompete enforcement. In particular, where the agree-
ment purports to limit a spouse's right to support, courts have 
traditionally held that the allocation provided to that spouse 
must be reasonable for the agreement to be enforceable. 213 
Thus, agreements providing for a waiver of all inheritance rights 
or a relinquishment of any claim to alimony by a dependent 
spouse have frequently been set aside.214 
In addition to this line of inquiry, however , the law of premari-
tal agreements has also focused heavily on issues of procedural 
fairness in the formation of the contract. A prevalent factor in 
assessing the enforceability of property allocations, for instance, 
is whether there was a full disclosure of assets by the party seek-
women are uninformed, uneducated , and readily subjected to unfair advantage in 
marital agreements") ; see also Marston , supra note 205, at 897-98 (noting decrease 
in court expressions of paternalism toward women correlating with increase in en-
forcement of premarital agreements) . 
212 See In re Marriage of Bonds , 5 P.3d 815, 829 (Cal. 2000) (noting that unlike 
commercial agreements that operate as a guide to achieving a joint objective , a pre-
marital agreement is formed with the "a nticipat(ion] that it never will be invoked" 
and "exists to provide for eventualities that will arise only if the relationship foun-
ders, possibly in the distant future under greatly changed and unforeseeable circum-
stances") ; AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS ANO RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No . 4, 2000) 
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES] ("Parties ent ering a family relationship have expectations 
about their future partn er that may disarm their capacity for self-protective judg-
ment, or their inclination to exercise it, as compared to parties negotiating other 
kinds of contracts."). 
213 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman , 653 P.2d 728, 736 (Colo . 1982); Scherer v. 
Scherer , 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (Ga. 1982); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E .2d 810, 816 
(Mass . 1981); Osborn , 226 N.E.2d at 817; In re Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423, 428 
(Pa. 1987); Whitney v. Seattle-First Nat ' ! Bank, 579 P.2d 937, 940 (Wash . 1978). 
214 See , e.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); 
Eule v. Eule, 320 N.E .2d 506,510 (Ill. App . Ct. 1974); Johnson v. Johnson , No . 3-91-
50, 1992 WL 209320, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App . Aug. 26, 1992); Bloomfield v. Bloomfield , 
723 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). rev 'd, 97 N.Y.2d 188 (N .Y. 2001); see 
also Matter of Marriage of Matson. 730 P.2d 668, 672 (Wash. 1986) (noting that in 
the event an agreement "attempts to eliminate, totally . community property rights, 
the court must zealously and scrupulously examine it for fairness"). 
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ing enforcement. 215 Courts stress that for the agreement to with-
stand challenge, the spouse opposing enforcement must have 
signed the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. 216 Some courts 
have suggested that the waiving spouse must not only be in-
formed of the financial position of the partner seeking enforce-
ment, but must also be cognizant of his or her rights to support 
and property. 217 Thus, while there is no requirement of review 
by independent counsel, whether the waiving party had the op-
portunity to consult with an attorney is a factor to be considered 
in determining enforceability. 218 Furthermore, courts reviewing 
premarital agreements will frequently look to case-specific in-
dicators of fairness in the bargaining process in making an assess-
ment of voluntariness. For instance, the timing of the 
presentation of the agreement to the waiving spouse may impact 
enforcement: Courts are inclined to reject agreements presented 
too close to the time of the wedding to afford an opportunity for 
meaningful reflection. 219 Finally, courts look directly at the rela-
215 See, e.g., In re Estate of Ingmand, No. 00-1281, 2001 WL 855406, at *2 (Iowa 
Ct. App. July 31, 2001); McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn. 
1989); Simeone, 581 A .2d at 167; Whitney, 579 P.2d at 939; see also Gross, 464 
N.E.2d at 506 (noting that premarital agreement is valid and enforceable where, 
inter alia, "there was a full disclosure, or full knowledge, and understanding, [sic) of 
the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse's property"). 
216 See, e.g., Potter v. Collin, 321 So. 2d 128, 132 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App. 1975); 
Rinvelt v. Rinvelt, 475 N.W.2d 478,481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); McKee-Johnson, 444 
N.W.2d at 265; Lester v. Lester, 87 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949); 
Whitney, 579 P.2d at 939; Osborn, 226 N.E.2d at 817; Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 
114 (W. Va. 1985). 
217 See , e.g., Geyer, 533 A.2d at 429 (noting that sufficient disclosure to sustain 
validity of premarital agreement "must include both the general financial pictures of 
the parties involved, and evidence that the parties are aware of the statutory rights 
which they are relinquishing") ; Matson, 730 P.2d at 673 (noting in voiding prenuptial 
agreement that wife did not have "even a minimal understanding of the legal conse-
quences of the rights she was signing away"). 
21s See, e.g., Lutgen, 338 So. 2d at 1117 (finding agreement unenforceable where 
wife was presented with agreement twenty-four hours before the wedding and was 
not afforded an opportunity to consult with an attorney); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 
N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994) ("[W)hen an antenuptial agreement provides dispro-
portionately less than the party would receive under an equitable distribution, the 
party financially disadvantaged must have a meaningful opportunity to consult with 
counsel. "); cf McKee-Johnson , 444 N.W.2d at 266 (finding no procedural unfairness 
where wife waived her right to counsel and so acknowledged in the agreement); see 
also UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 49-50 (2001) (noting 
that lack of assistance of counsel may be one factor in determining whether the 
statutory preconditions to enforceability of a premarital agreement are met). 
219 See Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1116 (voiding agreement where husband "sprang the 
agreement upon [his future wife] and demanded its execution within twenty-four 
hours of the wedding"); Bauer v. Bauer, 464 P.2d 710, 712 (Or. Ct. App. 1970) (in-
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tive sophistication of the parties. Where a court deems the waiv-
ing spouse to be knowledgeable and experienced, his or her 
relinquishment of rights may be found enforceable despite the 
fact that the agreement's provisions would otherwise seem 
unfair. 220 
While the law in this area continues to consist of a review of 
both the substantive effects of enforcement and the contract for-
mation process, the trend appears to be in favor of less of the 
former and more of the latter. In 1983, in response to concerns 
about uncertainty and inconsistency in the enforcement of pre-
marital agreements, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform Laws promulgated the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act (UPAA). 221 Substantially adopted by twenty-six 
states, 222 the UPAA adopts a standard of enforcement that fo-
cuses almost entirely on contract formation issues, but which still 
accounts for circumstances peculiar to marriage. Its purpose is to 
enhance the enforceability and reliability of premarital 
agreements. 
The UPAA provides that a premarital agreement is enforcea-
ble unless (1) it was not executed voluntarily, or (2) it was uncon-
scionable at the time it was entered into and the party opposing 
enforcement did not know of or receive fair disclosure of his or 
her partner's assets. 223 Voluntariness, the primary issue in chal-
validating prenuptial agreement where wife was not advised of agreement until she 
was en route to the wedding); Matson, 730 P.2d at 672 (voiding prenuptial agree-
ment because wife was required to sign contract on her wedding day, only three days 
after it was first presented to her). 
220 See, e.g .. Hengel v. Hengel, 365 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (noting 
that the wife was "moderately sophisticated in financial matters. that she was made 
aware of the contents of financial statements and. [sic] that she had independent 
knowledge of the substantial size of [husband's] estate before the marriage" in find-
ing premarital agreement enforceable); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 
1985) (finding premarital agreement reasonable and enforceable despite wife's 
waiver of all alimony rights where "[b]oth parties were middle-aged, both had been 
married before, and the divorce occurred sufficiently close in time ... to the signing 
of the agreement"); Potter, 321 So. 2d at 132 (finding premarital agreement enforce-
able where wife "was an educated woman with experience in the world of business 
and with experience in divorce and property settlement agreements" and chose to 
sign agreement against advice of counsel). 
221 For a discussion of the debate leading to the Commissioners' adoption of the 
UPAA standard, see In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 823-26 (Cal. 2000). 
222 Nat'! Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Drafts of Uni-
form and Model Acts, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm 
(last visited May 17, 2002). 
223 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001). 
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lenging enforcement, looks to the quality of consent at the time 
of drafting. While not defined in the uniform law, the term has 
been interpreted as embracing many of the special procedural 
issues considered at common law, including coercion based on 
surprise or proximity to the parties' wedding, the presence or 
availability of counsel, knowledgeableness and sophistication of 
the waiving party, and whether there was a disclosure of as-
sets.224 In this way, the UPAA standard contemplates the ability 
to set aside an agreement for reasons beyond those which would 
justify a duress defense in a commercial context. 225 On the other 
hand, it limits inquiry into the substantive effects of the terms, 
choosing to evaluate substance through the lens of unconsciona-
bility rather than the common law reasonableness standard. 226 
224 The most sustained assessment of the UPAA voluntariness standard is the re-
cent California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d at 824-
25, which discusses such factors. For additional discussion, see Schwarz v. Schwarz, 
No. 01-99-01365-CV, 2000 WL 1708518, at *2-3 (Tex. App. Nov. 16, 2000); Donovan 
v. Donovan, No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141, at *3-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1999). In 
addition, the most recent tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Principles 
of the Law of Family Dissolution enumerates similar factors as relevant to determin-
ing whether a party's consent was "informed and not obtained under duress," the 
standard for enforceability adopted therein. PRINCIPLES, supra note 212, § 7.05(2). 
Specifically, under the ALI draft, where the parties are independently represented 
and sign the agreement at least thirty days before the marriage, a rebuttable pre-
sumption arises that the consent/no-duress requirement is satisfied. Id. § 7.05(3); see 
also Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolu-
tion, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 231, 236-37 (2001) (discussing the ALi's "pro-
cedural requirements" for the enforcement of premarital agreements). 
225 See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 830. 
[W]e believe the reference to voluntariness in the Uniform [Premarital 
Agreement] Act was intended to convey an element of knowing waiver 
that is not a consistent feature of commercial contact enforcement ... [and] 
that subtle coercion that would not be considered in challenges to ordinary 
commercial contracts may be considered in the context of the premarital 
agreement. 
Id.; cf PRINCIPLES, supra note 212, § 7.05 cmt. b (contrasting adopted procedural 
requirements with traditional doctrine of duress that applies "only in very extreme 
cases of pressure" judged on the basis of objective circumstances). 
226 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). The 
comments to the UPAA indicate that this is the same standard that applies to ordi-
nary commercial contracts. See id. § 6 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 49-50 (2001). However, be-
cause the general inquiry into unconscionability contemplates a close examination of 
all facts and circumstances, consideration of unconscionability in the context of pre-
marital agreement formation would likely take account of features peculiar to the 
relationship of intended marital partners. See id. ("In the context of negotiations 
between spouses as to the financial incidents of their marriage, the [unconsion-
ability] standard includes protection against overreaching, concealment of assets, 
and sharp dealing not consistent with the obligations of marital partners to deal fairly 
with each other.") (emphasis added). 
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Significantly, the UPAA inquiry focuses on the circumstances 
that existed at the time of drafting, rather than the effect of the 
agreement at the time of enforcement as under some states' 
traditional common law standard. 227 Other than in narrow in-
stances in which a party is in danger of becoming a public charge, 
the court is not to set aside a contract voluntarily agreed to 
merely because its terms ultimately prove harsh toward one of 
the parties under the circumstances existing at the time of 
enforcement. 228 
Thus, the UPAA aspires to a uniform formation-based assess-
ment of the validity of premarital agreements, the defining fea-
ture of which is a searching examination of the circumstances 
surrounding the agreement process. To be sure, the proposed 
legislation has its critics, who argue for continued judicial review 
of the substantive effects of the agreement in light of the circum-
stances at the time of enforcement, particularly where the agree-
ment limits a party's rights to spousal support. 229 What the 
UPAA suggests, however, is that unfair results do not themselves 
form a basis for nonenforcement. Rather, terms that are uncon-
scionable at the time of drafting can be an indication of lack of 
consent in accordance with the traditional contract defense. 
While it is too soon to say whether the sort of fairness review that 
examines consequences of enforcement will be entirely elimi-
nated, the trend in the courts appears decidedly in favor of nor-
221 Id. § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). The ALI Principles of Family Dissolution 
take an approach slightly more favorable to the party seeking to avoid the agree-
ment, but which similarly limits inquiry into the substantive effects of the agreement. 
Pursuant to section 7.07 a court may not enforce a term of the parties' premarital 
agreement where enforcement "would work a substantial injustice," but such an in-
quiry may be made only where there has been a significant passage of time or 
change in circumstances between execution of the agreement and the time enforce-
ment is sought. PRINCIPLES, supra note 212, § 7.07(2); see also Bix, supra note 224, 
at 237-39. 
228 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). 
Id. 
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal 
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agree-
ment to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the 
time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the 
terms of the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to 
the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility. 
229 See Atwood, supra note 208, at 147-48 (criticizing UPAA "eligibility for public 
assistance" test for insufficiently protecting long-time homemakers who may have 
sufficient skills to earn a minimum wage but will be unable to maintain their current 
lifestyle under terms of the agreement). 
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malizing these agreements such that premarital contracts are 
considered presumptively enforceable absent irregularities in 
formation. 
C. Suggestions for a Formation-Based Analysis of 
Noncompetes: Assessing the Quality of Bargain 
and Exchange 
A formation-based analysis comparable to that recognized in 
the premarital agreement context can provide an alternative ap-
proach to assessing enforceability of noncompete agreements. 
As previously noted, because the distinguishing attribute of such 
an approach is its focus on the events surrounding the creation of 
the agreement, it is closer to a true contract analysis under which 
the parties' bargain is necessarily enforceable absent specific de-
fenses such as duress or unconscionability. 230 However, the for-
mation-based approach contemplated here goes beyond 
confirmation of bargain and exchange to a qualitative review of 
circumstances at the point of agreement. The inherent problem 
with noncompetes is that the parties' inability to define precisely 
their future obligations makes them unlikely to bargain seriously 
over contractual specifics or, from the perspective of the em-
ployee, to view the written agreement as the final arbiter of the 
terms of his or her relationship. 231 Courts must therefore ex-
amine more rigorously issues of consideration and assent to de-
termine whether the parties' agreement can be treated as a fair 
and consensual allocation of future risks. That goal may be ac-
complished by closely investigating at least three broad aspects of 
the formation process: the ability of the employee to bargain re-
garding the agreement's terms, the appropriateness of the scope 
of the restraint as of the time of formation, and the consideration 
provided by the employer in exchange for the noncompete. 
The first aspect of this form of review contemplates an exami-
nation of the bargaining process itself to determine whether the 
employee has given meaningful consent to the noncompete. Fear 
of unequal power relationships has long motivated court deci-
sions, yet the current legal test based on the protectable interest 
requirement does not provide for direct examination of the bar-
gaining process, nor would an approach focusing purely on sub-
230 See supra Part IV.B. 
231 See supra Part III.Cl. 
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stantive effects of enforcement. 232 Under a formation-based 
model of review, however, courts would consider the process by 
which the agreement was reached in order to determine whether 
the employee legitimately assumed the risk that the noncom-
pete's terms would prove onerous. 
In executing that inquiry, courts could look to many of the 
same factors deemed relevant under the law of premarital agree-
ments. The timing of the presentation of the agreement, whether 
there was actual discussion or negotiation regarding its terms, 
and the relative sophistication of the parties should all be rele-
vant in determining the agreement's enforceability. A noncom-
pete signed after the date of hire, for instance, should be 
presumptively unenforceable. In such a situation, it is impossible 
for the employee to assert any leverage in disputing the agree-
ment's terms, as the employee has already terminated his or her 
previous employment and done the preparation necessary to as-
sume the new position. 233 Courts should also consider whether 
the employee consulted with counsel. Although legal represen-
tation should not be a requirement, as with premarital agree-
ments, courts can look to whether the employee was informed of 
the significance of the noncompete and encouraged to have it 
232 Indeed, the current approach has been criticized for emphasizing a policy of 
protecting workers with unequal bargaining power but not taking actual bargaining 
power into account in assessing enforceability. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 28, at 
721-22 (asserting that most employees subject to noncompetes are "highly skilled" 
and "relatively sophisticated" and finding it "puzzling" that the law "protect[s) per-
sons who are able, ex ante, to assess the desirability of the terms, who are able to 
foresee the consequences of such terms, and who are free not to contract if the terms 
are sufficiently unfavorable"); cf Sterk, supra note 31, at 409 (observing that "[i)f 
unequal bargaining power were the only reason for refusing to enforce restrictive 
covenants, one would expect full enforcement in those cases where sophisticated 
parties, negotiating at arms length and with the assistance of counsel, bargained for 
restrictive covenants"); see also Lester, supra note 3, at 60-61 (describing current 
approach to bargaining power issue as "inconsistent" in that courts "pay[) lipservice 
to policing inequality of bargaining power, ... [but) routinely analyze covenants 
alone, paying scant attention to the actual bargaining power of the parties"). 
233 See, e.g., Flexcon Co. v. McSherry, 123 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(noting in refusing to grant preliminary injunction against competition that em-
ployee signed noncompete as part of "routine paperwork" three days after com-
mencing employment and neither offer letter nor letters regarding subsequent 
promotion mentioned covenant); Corroon & Black of Nashville, Inc. v. Lee, 1984 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 2695, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984) (refusing enforce-
ment of noncompete signed two weeks into employment in conjunction with related 
employment forms where employee had numerous preemployment discussions with 
employer regarding details of employment that did not include mention of 
noncompete ). 
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independently reviewed, such agreements being presumptively 
valid where the employee was educated as to the effect of the 
commitment and chose to sign it anyway. 234 Ultimately, this 
analysis should focus on all factors that indicate whether the em-
ployee had a real opportunity to alter or reject the agreement's 
terms, including the employer's amenability to negotiation and 
the extent of the employee's bargaining power. An unemployed 
individual signing a boilerplate agreement should be viewed dif-
ferently from a highly skilled worker voluntarily leaving a posi-
tion to assume a new job whose terms are negotiable. 235 
In addition to looking at the quality of the employee's consent 
from a procedural perspective, courts should also review the 
terms of the agreement itself. The second aspect of the forma-
tion-based approach to enforceability proposed here is an inquiry 
into the appropriateness of the restraint, which, like the UPAA's 
approach to substantive review, occurs as of the time of agree-
234 See , e.g. , Retina Servs., Ltd . v. Garoon , 538 N.E.2d 651, 651-52, 655 (Ill. App . 
Ct. 1989) (finding agreement enforceable against defendant-ophthalmologist who 
signed three prior negotiated agreements with employer while represented by coun-
sel and consulted a reputed expert in medical noncompete agreements prior to sign-
ing agreement sought to be enforced against him); Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, 
Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y . App . Div. 1996) (finding agreement enforceable where 
employees had option to sign noncompete in conjunction with new job with higher 
salary and chose to do so after consultation with counsel) ; cf Campbell Soup Co. v. 
Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 1999) (refusing to enjoin employer from seek-
ing to enforce noncompete where employee, who negotiated original employment 
contract under advice of counsel, had thirty-day period in which to review subse-
quent noncompete contract and elected not to seek representation) . But see Motion 
Control Sys., Inc . v. East , 546 S.E.2d 424,425 (Va. 2001) (finding noncompete over-
broad and unenforceable although employee consulted with counsel and succeeded 
in proposing minor changes to agreement before signing) . 
235 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d at 479-81 ( denying senior execu-
tive's motion to enjoin enforcement of noncompete against him where employee 
negotiated terms of origin al contract of employment and successfully refused 
noncompete pursuant to advice of counsel, but subsequently signed new contract 
containing noncompete two years later without making significant effort to renegoti-
ate agreement) ; Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett , 498 S.E.2d 346, 350 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding agreement enforceable against managing partner who "was 
in a bargaining position equivalent to that of [his employer]"); Delli -Gatti v. Mans-
field , 477 S.E.2d 134 (Ga . Ct. App . 1996) (holding noncompete enforceable against 
physician who was able to negotiate favorable changes in vacation time and partner-
ship opportunities under employment contract and had two other job opportunities 
when she elected to enter into plaintiffs employ); cf Maltby , 637 N.Y.S.2d at 111 
(finding agreement enforceable where employees "were provided with the choice of 
signing the contract containing the restrictive covenant or continuing with their old 
employment contract," which contained no noncompete but offered less favorable 
terms of employment). 
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ment. 236 Under the current legal test, reasonableness of scope, 
duration, and geographic limitation is evaluated as of the time of 
enforcement with little consideration of the parties' expectations 
at the point at which the agreement was formed. 237 Similarly, 
proposals based on enforcing relational norms or efficient out-
comes would assess the appropriateness of the agreement in the 
context of enforcement.2 38 However, it is the parties' initial ex-
pectations that indicate whether the agreement was intended to 
be a binding long-term solution to the problem of fluctuations in 
the parties' relationship over time. If the parties negotiated an 
agreement that was fair under the circumstances, the agreement 
should be enforceable. 
In making the difficult determination as to whether a noncom-
pete's terms were fair as of the time of agreement, the distinction 
drawn between liquidated damages and penalties in the area of 
contractual remedies provides a helpful analogy. Noncompetes 
may be compared to stipulated damages clauses insofar as em-
ployers view them as a predetermined measure of compensation 
for the premature departure of an employee. 239 Such clauses in 
commercial contracts are enforceable only if they represent a 
reasoned forecast of future loss where actual damages are diffi-
cult to assess.240 They are not enforceable if they are so dispro-
236 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001) (provid-
ing that "a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom en-
forcement is sought proves that ... the agreement was unconscionable when it was 
executed") (emphasis added); see also supra Part IV.B. 
237 See supra Part 1.8. 
238 See supra Part III.C.2. 
239 See Posner & Triantis, supra note 3 (suggesting that employers may use such 
clauses as alternatives to liquidated damages provisions, which are often ineffective 
due to capital constraints of employees). Similar comparisons have been made be-
tween stipulated damages clauses and premarital agreements. See, e.g., Recent De-
velopments: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Substantive Review of Prenuptial 
Agreements, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1402-03 (1991). 
240 See Cray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). 
"[P)arties to an agreement may provide for the payment of liquidated damages upon 
its breach, and such damages will be upheld if (1) the amount fixed is a reasonable 
measure of the probable actual loss in the event of breach, and (2) the actual loss 
suffered is difficult to determine precisely." Id. (quoting Willner v. Willner, 538 
N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)). 
"Liquidated damages is the sum a party to a contract agrees to pay if he 
breaks some promise, and which, having been arrived at by a good faith 
effort to estimate in advance the actual damages that will probably ensue 
from the breach, is legally recoverable as agreed damages if the breach 
occurs." 
Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, 645 A.2d 100, 105-06 (N.J. 1994) 
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portionate to the sustained loss as to suggest an intent to compel 
performance. 241 With respect to noncompetes, the current legal 
rules encourage employers to use broadly drafted standardized 
forms which may be revised at the time of enforcement, but 
which in the interim create strong disincentives against employee 
defection. 242 
To encourage the creation of more well-reasoned agreements, 
courts assessing enforceability should consider whether the 
agreement is actually sculpted to reflect the employer's antici-
pated needs for the particular job opening. Like the UPAA, such 
an approach relies on the law of unconscionability in examining 
the terms as of the time of drafting, but should reach beyond the 
limited substantive review associated with commercial uncon-
scionability to consider the reasonableness of terms. In con-
ducting that inquiry, courts should consider all of the existing 
reasonableness factors , including scope, duration, and geographic 
limitations with the burden on the employer to prove the reason-
ableness of the request as of the time of formation. 
One aspect of reasonableness that courts currently do not, but 
should, consider directly is whether the duration of the restraint 
is affected by the length of the parties' relationship. Employers 
should have an obligation to make reasoned assessments of their 
expected commitment from employees in relation to their 
(quoting Westmount Country Club v. Kameny, 197 A.2d 379, 382 (N .J. Super. Ct . 
App. Div. 1964)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 356(1) (1981) 
("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only 
at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused 
by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.") . 
241 See Equity Enters. v. Milosch, 633 N.W.2d 662, 671-73 (Wis. Ct . App. 2001) 
(noting that "[s]tipulated damages substantially in excess of injury justify an infer-
ence of ... an objectionabl e in terrorem agreement design ed to deter a party from 
breaching the contract" in concluding that clause requiring payment of sum equaling 
three and a half times actual loss must be "closely scrutinized" in determining en-
forceability on remand) ; Capricorn Sys., Inc. v. Pednekar, 546 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2001) (finding stipulated damages clause that "arbitrarily" set damages at 
$50,000 unenforceable where recited amount bore "no rational relationship to actual 
or potential damages " and special damages could be "easily calculated as substan-
tially less than the liquidated damages in the contract "); Coleman v. Chamberlain & 
Sons, Inc. , 766 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App . 2000) (holding unenforceable 
stipulated damages provision requiring former employee to pay 200% of one year's 
gross revenue for each defecting client where former employer demonstrated no 
actual damages and admitted purpose of clause was to penalize former employees); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 356(1) (1981) ("A term fixing unreason-
ably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a 
penalty."). 
242 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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planned investment and draft noncompetes with restraints that 
diminish the longer the employee stays in his or her job, much 
like a pay back agreement. 243 An agreement that does not pro-
vide for an enforceability cap based on length of service could be 
deemed presumptively unreasonable. In addition, courts can en-
hance the reasonableness assessment by considering industry 
standards relevant to the job in question, much in the way trade 
usages are employed in evaluating commercial agreements. 244 
Since employers find themselves on both sides of this issue, as 
parties seeking to restrain departing employees and parties seek-
ing to hire individuals subject to such restraints, courts should 
defer to an apparent consensus on what constitutes the appropri-
ate scope, duration, or area for a noncompete. 
The purpose of such inquiries is to move from a regime in 
which courts essentially redraft the parties' agreements based on 
the circumstances at the time of enforcement to one in which the 
parties make a knowing decision to have specified contractual 
terms supercede some of the otherwise flexible aspects of their 
implicit agreement. Thus, in assessing the reasonableness of the 
noncompete, a final factor to assess should be the consideration 
offered to the employee. This suggestion departs from the pre-
marital agreement model, which treats the impending marriage 
as the consideration for the agreement from the perspective of 
both parties and does not inquire further into the existence of an 
exchange. 245 The law of noncompetes has historically taken a 
similar approach, treating the employment itself as the considera-
tion for the employee's promise. 246 Although the employee's po-
243 For instance, Colorado's statute on restraints of trade permits employers to 
enforce repayment agreements only in instances where the employee departs within 
two years of hire. See Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (2001). 
244 Cf U.C.C. § 2-202 (2001) (providing that a final written agreement may be 
supplemented by usages of trade). The U.C.C. defines "usage of trade" as "any 
practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, voca-
tion or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the 
transaction in question." Id. § 1-205(2). 
245 See In re Marriage of Barnes, 755 N.E.2d 522, 527 (111. App. Ct. 2001 ); Lieber-
man v. Lieberman, 587 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("[P)remarital agree-
ments are entered into in contemplation of marriage and the consideration for the 
agreement is the marriage itself."); cf UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 2, 9C 
U.L.A. 41 (2001) ("A premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both 
parties. It is enforceable without consideration."). 
246 See, e.g., Garcia v. Laredo Collections, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 97, 98-99 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1980) ("When the execution of a covenant not to compete is contemporaneous 
with the acceptance of employment, the latter becomes the consideration for the 
covenant."). 
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sition may be at-will, courts have taken the view that continued 
employment up to the point at which enforcement is sought cre-
ates sufficient after-the-fact consideration, to support the em-
ployee's earlier promise not to compete. 247 
If courts are to consider the reasonableness of the noncompete 
and the quality of the employee's consent, however, they must to 
some extent take account of what the employee was offered in 
exchange for that agreement. Where there is a written contract 
of employment, of employment that assure some form of job se-
curity, such as a fixed term or for-cause discharge provision, 
could create the presumption of a fair agreement. 248 However, 
where the parties enter into an at-will relationship, courts should 
look to see what, if anything, the employee was offered beyond 
the mere opportunity to perform the job. Such an inquiry would 
merely require that the terms of the at-will arrangement suggest 
that the employee's decision to accept the agreement was a rea-
soned one. Such terms could include the award of a signing bo-
nus for those employees accepting the agreement, higher wages 
than what is generally offered for such a position in the relevant 
market, or the promise of job-related training or opportunities 
247 See Coastal Unilube, Inc. v. Smith, 598 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (finding sufficient consideration to support noncompete where at-will sales-
man worked less than one year after signing agreement); Brignull v. Albert, 666 
A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995) (finding sufficient consideration to support noncompete 
where optometrist worked three years after signing agreement); Copeco, Inc. v. Ca-
ley, 632 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding sufficient consideration to 
uphold noncompetes where at-will copy machine salesmen worked two years after 
signing agreements before resigning to start competing company) ; see also supra 
note 16. In instances in which the agreement is requested long after employment is 
commenced, however , some courts require that the employee receive some increase 
in compensation, authority, or benefits to support the employee's promise. See, e.g., 
Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd. , 1334 N.W.2d 626,630 (Minn. 1983) (finding invalid 
noncompete agreement signed two years after beginning employment and months 
after a new promotion because no new consideration such as a pay raise, new pro-
motion, or other benefit was offered to employee physician). 
248 Existing case law suggests that courts are more inclined to enforce noncom-
petes in situations where the employer offers reciprocal benefits under a formal con-
tract. See , e.g. , Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage , Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (N.Y. 
App . Div. 1996) (finding agreement enforceable where employer offered employees 
new contract providing more job security and higher salary than employees received 
in their previous positions) ; cf Becker v. Blair , 361 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App . 
1985) (enforcing employee 's promise to repay training costs pursuant to fixed-term 
employment agreement); Corroon & Black of Nashville, Inc. v. Lee, 1984 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 2695, at *5-8 (Tenn . Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984) (distinguishing cases in 
which employee was promised term employment or notice prior to discharge in re-
fusing to enforce noncompete signed by at-will employee after commencing 
employment). 
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for skills development. 249 As apparent from the last of these 
nonexhaustive examples, this inquiry may consider some of the 
factors relevant to the protectable interest inquiry. However, the 
focus of the inquiry is not the employer's need for protection but 
whether the terms of the employment offer justify the risk to the 
employee. 250 
The preceding suggestions illustrate how a formation-based in-
quiry might affect the determination of a noncompete's enforce-
ability. Like the current test and other proposals for reform, the 
formation-based model has a number of limitations. It cannot 
guarantee just results for every employee or eliminate the prob-
lem of unpredictable results. In addition, the formation-based 
model focuses on the competing interests of employer and em-
ployee and gives limited regard to third party concerns, such as 
the public's interest in freely accessing an employee's services.251 
249 While such factors are not formally part of the existing legal inquiry, such con-
siderations clearly compel many court decisions, particularly where the employee is 
highly compensated. See, e.g., Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1989) (noting in enforcing noncompete that employee's 1987 negotiated 
contract provided for compensation in excess of $300,000 plus $50,000 in fringe ben-
efits); EMC Corp. v. Allen, No. 97-5972-B, 1997 WL 1366836 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 
15, 1997) (noting in enforcing noncompete that employee was compensated with an 
annual salary of approximately one million dollars including bonuses and stock op-
tions); cf Flexcon v. McSherry, 123 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting in 
denial of employer's request for injunction that defendant's job was not "as high-
powered, well-compensated or international as job" in precedent case which found 
noncompete enforceable). 
250 Texas courts have adopted an approach consistent with this suggestion. By 
statute, noncompetes in Texas are unenforceable unless "ancillary to or part of an 
otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the [noncompete] agreement is made." 
TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Because courts have held 
that the commencement of an at-will employment relationship does not constitute 
an "otherwise valid agreement," where an employer seeks to enforce a noncompete 
against a worker with no job security, it must establish a separate consideration for 
the restraint, such as an express promise to provide specialized training. See, e.g., 
Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Tex. 1994). Presumably, this 
means that the employer's failure to provide the promised consideration would be 
actionable and could excuse the employee's compliance with the terms of the post-
employment restraint. See id. at 626 (suggesting that employer's promise to provide 
training in an agreement containing a noncompete clause would be enforceable 
against the employer regardless of the duration of the parties' employment 
relationship). 
251 The Restatement version of the current doctrinal test for enforceability nomi-
nally precludes enforcement of noncompetes where "the promissee's need [for an 
injunction] is outweighed by the hardship to ... the public [at large]." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 188 (1981). However, in administering the rule of 
reason, few courts directly consider the public interest as a factor distinct from the 
effect of the agreement on the employee himself or herself. See supra note 37 and 
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The analysis offered here, however, does not preclude develop-
ment of additional defenses to enforcement or application of 
other sources of law designed to protect either the contracting 
parties or the public. 252 What the formation-based approach of-
fers is a preliminary compromise between treating noncompete 
agreements as ordinary contracts and subjecting them to outright 
review for substantive fairness to the employee based on 
postformation effects. The approach aims not at prescribing ap-
propriate terms for a given employment relationship, but rather 
at ensuring that the contract vehicle is used responsibly. The for-
mation-based model encourages employers to use discretion in 
requesting these agreements and attempts to provide employees 
with an opportunity to review and to question them. The ulti-
mate goal is to enforce those noncompetes that are entered into 
with recognition of their distinct legal consequences, and avoid 
accompanying text. This omission is consistent with the view expressed by some that 
despite rhetoric regarding the harsh societal effects of restraints on trade, the an-
ticompetitive effects of individual employee noncompete agreements are negligible. 
See , e.g., Sterk , supra note 31, at 406-08 ; Callahan , supra note 28, at 712-18 . On the 
other hand, if the public interest is an important concern , but is omitted from the 
existing inquiry on the assumption that policing reasonableness effectively elimi-
nates third party effects, it may be necessary to supplement the formation-based 
model of enforcement with an exception that captures those cases in which unique 
facts suggest that enforcement will unduly burden the public, for instance where a 
noncompete will deprive a small community of its physician. 
252 For instance , it may be useful to consider how doctrines such as impossibility 
could apply to protect employees in situations where unforeseeable changes in the 
market or other unexpected circumstances render noncompetition impracticable 
under the terms of the agreement. The possibility of such an application is sug-
gested by the ALI approach to premarital agreement enforcement, which permits a 
limited defense where there has been a significant and unanticipated change in cir-
cumstances and enforcement would work a substantial injustice. See PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 212, § 7.07(2); see also supra note 233. 
With respect to third party interests, a lingering question remains the extent to 
which federal antitrust law might apply to prohibit certain noncompete agreements. 
Some scholars and commentators have argued that the antitrust regime may be an 
appropriate tool for policing the aggregate effect of such agreements on particular 
industries from a public perspective , in contrast to state law which concentrates pri-
marily on the balance of interests between the individual employer and employee. 
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 5, at 647-50; Note , The Anritrust Implications of Em-
ploy ee Noncompete Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 MINN . L. REv. 519, 
546-49 (1982). Courts, however, have thus far been reluctant to embrace such an 
approach. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Protective Servs . Corp . v. Guardsmark , Inc. , 946 
F. Supp . 495, 498-500 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding it " impossible , as a matter of law, 
for ... employees to provide the plurality of actors imperative for a § l conspiracy " 
under the Sherman Act because employees "did not have an independent personal 
stake ... [or] stand to benefit from conspiring to restrain trade"). 
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those that serve merely as placeholders guaranteeing the em-
ployer a judicially crafted remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has advocated a formation-based approach to 
noncompete enforceability in recognition of the mounting prob-
lem of unpredictable and inconsistent case results and the discon-
nect between the current legal test and employers' interest in 
employee retention. Existing law strives to maintain an historical 
distinction between the use of noncompetes to protect narrowly 
defined business interests and the impermissible use of noncom-
petes that restrain individual workers, a distinction that proves 
unworkable in many modern contexts. The excess of reported 
decisions, and the confusion they demonstrate, is attributable in 
part to inherent difficulties in crafting and applying a definition 
for confidential business information. It is also due to the fact 
that in some instances employers have a legitimate interest in re-
taining workers who are themselves important business assets. 
A central concern of the Article has therefore been achieving 
an alternative approach to enforceability that abandons the pro-
tectable interest concept without abandoning the underlying 
principles that support some judicial intervention to protect 
workers. The problem with the current approach, and many ex-
isting proposals for reform, is that its focus on the after-the-fact 
effects of the agreement increases the uncertainty of enforce-
ment, undermines freedom of contract, and eliminates any incen-
tives for employers to craft these agreements with care. Even 
where the employee has bargaining power, there is unlikely to be 
negotiation over the terms of a noncompete in a legal regime 
where courts will reinterpret or rewrite the agreement in light of 
future events. If the law of premarital agreements is any indica-
tion, a better approach may be to invite judicial scrutiny of the 
formation process as opposed to the consequences of enforce-
ment. Such an approach treats noncompetes as contracts and re-
views them in accordance with basic contract principles, but 
requires greater scrutiny of contractual formalities than would be 
expected in a typical commercial exchange. Whether such an ap-
proach could be useful in evaluating other unilaterally imposed 
terms in employment contracts may well be an issue worth ex-
ploring in future research. 253 At least with respect to noncom-
253 For example, one potentially fruitful area of inquiry may be the applicability of 
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petes, by evaluating the quality of the employee's consent, both 
in terms of the process by which agreement is reached and the 
terms of the parties' exchange, courts may achieve a fairer and 
more consistent balance between preserving employers' right to 
contract and protecting employees from the effects of burden-
some terms. 
a formation-based analysis to contractual agreements to arbitrate future employ-
ment disputes, including federal discrimination claims. Since the Supreme Court's 
1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991), 
which held that such arbitration agreements are enforceable subject to ordinary con-
tract defenses, lower courts have consistently enforced such arbitration agreements 
provided the employee had some minimal awareness of the existence of the arbitra-
tion clause and there is no showing of fraud or duress. See, e.g., Seus v. John 
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1998). Some have criticized this ap-
proach , however, as failing to account sufficiently for the inequality in the parties' 
respective bargaining positions and have suggested that employee consent to such 
agreements is insufficiently informed to constitute a voluntary waiver of the proce-
dural rights afforded under federal employment legislation . See, e.g., Eileen Silver-
stein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship 
Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 512-24 (2001) . Whether the prin-
ciples espoused in this piece could form the basis for a more nuanced approach to 
analyzing the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate is a question for further anal-
ysis that is beyond the scope of the Article. 
